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INTRODUCTION
This paper is about the Food and Drug Administration, and the tactics that regulated { and sometimes
unregulated { industries use to inuence that agency's decision-making process. Many of these tactics are
legal; others are illegal, but dicult to recognize and police. In virtually every case, the purpose of these
tactics is to undermine the neutral and detached scientic processes to which the FDA aspires, in order to
advance the nancial interests of regulated industries. While some of the details recounted herein are gravely
disturbing, even outrageous, the purpose of this paper is not to moralize, but to identify these tactics and
assess them in a neutral fashion, in order that they may oer some lesson about the systemic structures that
created them.
Concern about the interaction between the government and regulated industry is not a new development.
In 1978, Richard Crout observed, with some disdain, that \It appeals to the biases of nearly everyone to
view regulatory controversies as basically one-on-one contests between the virtuous and the untrustworthy."1
While this paper will explore in detail the sometimes unsavory methods by which industries regulated by
the FDA seek to inuence the regulatory process to their own advantage, it will attempt to heed Crout's
warning to avoid simplistic, Manichean analyses of what are, and should be treated as, complex systemic
problems. Not every agreement or accommodation between the FDA and its constituent industries should
be assumed to represent an abandonment of its statutory obligations; any agency that attempted to litigate
1Richard J. Crout, \The Nature of Regulatory Choices," 33 Food Drug Cosmetic Law Journal 413 (1978)
5every potential violation would drown itself in the legal process, and frustrate the accomplishment of its
mission. Likewise, it would be unfair to assume that every document request made by a member of Congress
is part of a shadowy conspiracy; aggressive oversight by Congress is essential to the proper accountability
and functioning of any regulatory agency.
What this paper does seek to explore, however, is the range of methods and techniques by which aggressive
industry advocates have subtly shifted the balance of power away from the FDA and the consumer and toward
regulated industries. The rst part of the paper will deal primarily with the example oered by the tobacco
industry, which has waged a protracted and ultimately successful campaign to avoid the regulation of its
products by the FDA. I have chosen the tobacco industry (and not, for example, the pharmaceutical industry)
for two reasons: rst, because the tobacco industry has been resourceful, determined, and spectacularly
creative in its eorts, pioneering many of the techniques that are now widely employed by more benign
industries; and second, because the extended civil litigation surrounding the health eects of tobacco smoke
has given the public unrivaled access to the internal deliberations and eorts of the industry.
The second part of this paper will focus on a far more benign product, a controversial food additive that
has received little serious attention in the mainstream media: Procter & Gamble's \non-fat fat" olestra.
Unlike the tobacco industry, the internal machinations of the Procter & Gamble Corporation remain largely
shrouded in secrecy. There is enough evidence already available to the public, however, to interpolate
and extrapolate from what we know to what we can surmise, and to compare and contrast the techniques
employed by this giant of the food products industry to its counterparts in the world of tobacco.
What I hope to show is that the techniques that the tobacco industry perfected are not unique to that now
6notorious industry, but are in fact routinely employed by a range of companies we often think of as harmless.2
Evidence suggests that if we were given access to the inner workings of Procter & Gamble, or indeed of any
large American corporation with a signicant nancial stake in a regulatory proceeding before the FDA,
we would nd strategies every bit as clever, methods every bit as calculating, as we nd in the records of
the tobacco industry giants. Perhaps it should come as no surprise that equivalently situated companies of
the same scale, advised by the very same attorneys and guided by the very same public relations experts,
will exploit every available opportunity to advance their agenda, and will pursue that agenda every bit as
ruthlessly as the corporate leadership of Philip Morris or Brown & Williamson. Nevertheless, I think it would
surprise most citizens that this is so { and the revelation that the techniques described herein are routine
practice would ll them with shock and dismay. The purpose of this paper, however, is not to shock and
dismay, but to stimulate thought and debate about structural reforms of the regulatory apparatus and the
means by which interested parties seek to inuence them.3
2If anything, the actions of the tobacco industry are strongly reective of corporate norms. Evidence suggests it is unrealistic
to imagine that industry will practice any more self-restraint than prudence demands. See Albert Z. Carr, \Is Business Blung
Legal?" 46 Harv. Business Rev. 143 (1968). In that article, a Midwestern executive (who remains, by request, anonymous)
says, \So long as a businessman complies with the laws of the land and avoids telling malicious lies, he's ethical. If the law as
written gives a man a wide-open chance to make a killing, he'd be a fool not to take advantage of it. If he doesn't somebody
else will. There's no obligation on him to stop and consider who is going to get hurt. If the law says he can do it, that's all
the justication he needs. There's nothing unethical about that. It's just plain business sense." While (at the behest of public
relations consultants), most businessmen publicly deny that they see their own conduct in such Machiavellian terms, there is
ample evidence that this is the dominant understanding in the corporate world. Indeed, adherence to a form of this creed is
widely considered mandatory among corporate legal counsel.
3The primary purpose of this paper is descriptive, rather than prescriptive; it seeks to identify and explore the methods of
industry inuence on the FDA, but it is not a comprehensive plan to reform the federal campaign nance system, to regulate
the lobbying industry, or to restructure our nation's methods of funding scientic research.
7THE ROLE OF THE FDA
In 1938, Congress enacted the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act (FDCA) to protect consumers'
health and welfare by preventing the introduction or receipt of misbranded or adulterated medicines, foods,
or cosmetics.4 To give teeth to this goal, the FDCA conferred on the Secretary of Health, Education
and Welfare (now Health and Human Services) the authority to issue regulations;5 the Secretary, in turn,
delegated the authority to act under the FDCA to the Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA).6 To fulll its mission of protecting consumers, the FDA has been granted the \power to approve and
regulate drugs, vaccines, over-the-counter remedies, food additives, medical devices, and animal medications;
to inspect factories and set standards on food production; to sample marketed foods for impurities; and to
regulate advertising for food, drugs, and cosmetics."7 Today the FDA is one of the most inuential regulatory
agencies in the nation, with jurisdiction over products that account for twenty-ve cents of every consumer
dollar { worth more than $1 trillion annually.8
THE IMPREGNABLE FDA
With its vast responsibilities, and authority to make decisions with enormous nancial ramications, it should
come as little surprise that industry forces have long sought to inuence the FDA in its decision-making
processes. What is surprising is the impressive record the FDA has achieved over most of the course of its
existence of resisting the overtures of some of the nation's most powerful interest groups. Where other arms
of the federal bureaucracy have been accused of being \captured" by the constituencies they are supposed
4See 21 U.S.C. xx 301-395 (1994 & Supp. 1997); see also United States v. Two Bags, Poppy Seeds, 147 F.2d 123, 126-27
(6th Cir. 1945) (discussing the intent of the FDCA).
5See 21 U.S.C. x 371(a) (1994).
6See 21 C.F.R. x 5.10(a) (1997).
7\Perspectives: GOP Sets Its Sight on Food & Drug Administration," Med. & Health, Feb. 20, 1995
8Henry I. Miller, \The Wrong Choice For The FDA," The Wall Street Journal, June 26, 1998, p. A14.
8to regulate (including, for instance, the Departments of Agriculture and Energy), the FDA has achieved a
praiseworthy reputation for independence and scientic integrity.
To be sure, the FDA's record is not spotless. In 1987, the Agency suered through one of its darkest hours,
in what became known as the Generic Drug scandal. An FDA supervisor named Charles Chang had received
expensive gifts (including a fur coat and a videocassette recorder) from drug company lobbyists, in exchange
for arranging that their drugs received expedited Agency approval. Chang knew which of his subordinates
were quick workers, and which were more methodical; by controlling the assignment of projects, he found
he could manipulate the approval schedule. Chang's actions were a gross betrayal of the public trust, and
a black eye for the Agency. By the end, Chang was in a federal prison, and forty-two other people and ten
companies were convicted on charges of fraud and corruption.9
What made the Generic Drug scandal so newsworthy was not merely its tawdriness, but how out of place it
was in the history of the Agency. For the most part, those who would exert undue inuence over bureaucratic
decision-making appear to have had far less success with the FDA than with other agencies of the federal
government. Peter Barton Hutt and Richard Merrill, each a former general counsel to the FDA, oer a
number of explanations for FDA's relative impregnability. First, they suggest, \the evident scientic basis
for most of FDA's positions has helped insulate it from many of the customary forms of political pressure."10
Second, they cite the agency's public prole, which exceeds those of many Cabinet-level agencies: \the
visibility of FDA's programs has given the agency, and thus the Commissioner, a public standing that
frequently blunts pressure from within any incumbent administration."11 Finally, Hutt and Merrill cite
the composition of the rank-and-le personnel of the Agency, noting that because \few jobs have been
9David Kessler, \A Question of Intent: A Great American Battle With A Deadly Industry," PublicAairs, New York, 2001,
p.8
10Peter Barton Hutt and Richard A. Merrill, \Food and Drug Law: Cases and Materials, University Casebook Series,
Foundation Press, Westbury, NY, 1991, p.16
11Id.
9subject to political appointment... for most of its existence FDA has operated with considerable decisional
independence and enjoyed continuity in the service of employees who hold middle-management positions and
sta its several eld oces."12
Certainly some of the factors Hutt and Merrill mention remain clearly present in the contemporary FDA;
the esteem in which the public held former Commissioner David Kessler, and the constraints this put on
President George H. W. Bush, nicely illustrate the Commissioner's potential for \blunting pressure from
within... the administration." Indeed, in an era where the federal government, and especially the federal
bureaucracy, have often been held up to public ridicule, the FDA remains an extremely popular agency,
one which commands respect and admiration from citizens across the political spectrum. According to a
1997 nationwide poll of registered voters, the FDA rates among the federal agencies in which they have the
greatest condence.13 Eighty-seven percent of voters saw the FDA as \necessary," and sixty-one percent
described the FDA as "very necessary."14 These favorable numbers remained despite the existence, at the
time of the poll, of a concerted public relations eort to discredit the FDA. Despite the increasingly partisan
nature of debate about the role of the federal government and of economic regulation, and the increasingly
partisan battle lines between pro-tobacco Republicans and anti-tobacco Democrats, support for the FDA
among the voters remained consistently strong across party lines: eighty-six percent of Republicans, eighty-
eight percent of independents, and eighty-eight percent of Democrats felt the FDA was \necessary."15 A
plurality (forty-ve percent) of those surveyed indicated their belief that the FDA does a better job than
other government agencies, a gure that included forty-three percent of self-identied Republicans; only
thirteen percent described the FDA as doing a worse job than other agencies.16
12Id.
13\America Supports FDA,\ Human Rights Campaign, Press Release, April 16, 1997. Analysis based on results from a
nationwide telephone survey of 1,000 registered voters by Lake Sosin Snell & Associates and the Tarrance Group, conducted
April 8-10, 1997. The margin of error for the sample is +/-3.1 percent.
14Id.
15Id.
16Id.
10But while FDA still commands the respect of the American public, many of the other factors that Hutt
and Merrill cite as providing political insulation have been compromised or eliminated since 1991, the last
edition of their text. Increasingly, industry representatives and their surrogates deride Agency scientists
as risk-averse and unnecessarily paternalistic, and openly challenge the scientic bases of FDA decisions.
Because the general public is largely incapable of choosing between conicting positions on the scientic
merits, \science" no longer serves as a trump for FDA. In addition, while the legacy of David Kessler has left
the FDA Commissioner with arguably a greater public prole and moral authority than ever before, turnover
among middle management has been greatly accelerated. It has now been nearly twenty-ve years since the
FDA launched Operation Hire, an initiative that expanded the agency by hundreds of people. As a result,
70% of all managers will be eligible for retirement between 1999 and 2001.17 Others are leaving because
of the treatment FDA ocials have received at the hands of an increasingly hostile Congress. \I decided
it was no longer worth my time to take the psychological and verbal abuse from members of Congress or
their sta," said Curtis Scribner, deputy director of the FDA's blood oce until late 1997. \I wasn't having
fun any more."18 Ralph Harkins, who spent more than a decade managing a major statistical division at
the FDA, said, \I just decided I wasn't getting the support I needed. I took my retirement and ran."19 In
Harkins' division, 12 of 22 statisticians departed between 1998 and 1999. Working conditions were clearly
a factor in the mass exodus; most of those who left had been working more than twelve hours a day to try
to keep up with more demanding approval deadlines.20 The hostility of the Congress and the budgetary
constraints it has imposed risk creating a self-perpetuating cycle: congressional antagonism forces out the
stabilizing core of middle managers, and the loss of their stability has left the FDA more vulnerable than
ever to undue inuence and bullying.
17Rochelle Sharpe, \FDA Tries to Find Right Balance on Drug Approvals," The Wall Street Journal, April 20, 1999
18Id.
19Id.
20Id.
11The state of the FDA's independence remains hotly debated. Consumer advocates like Larry Sasich of
Public Citizen argue that Commissioner Jane Henney \sold the farm" to win conrmation by a Republican
Congress, and that the agency has been \completely co-opted by industry."21 Others reject the notion
that FDA's integrity has been even remotely compromised by its struggles with hostile industries. Former
Deputy Commissioner Carol Scheman, for instance, atly rejects the suggestion that FDA ocials would
permit industry pressure to compromise their scientic judgement. \I don't think it's possible," she says.
\These are among the most rigidly moral people I know."22
If Larry Sasich perhaps overstates his case, Carol Scheman seems to ignore the practical realities of FDA's
situation. The prophylactic protections of a \rigidly moral" sta are vital in avoiding the Watergate-
style corruption that dened the Generic Drug scandal, but they are simply insucient to resist the kind
of systemic coercion to which the Agency is now legally subject. Because the methods by which industry
players inuence the FDA often go over and around, rather than through, the Food and Drug Administration,
the integrity of FDA's ocers has become a necessary, but not sucient characteristic for eective FDA
leadership. As the tobacco industry proved, it is possible to subvert the FDA without the Agency's assent.
SHADOW-BOXING WITH THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY
Industry actors who nd themselves unable to inuence the FDA directly have come to employ an array
of other techniques. These include providing the political campaigns of sympathetic lawmakers with nan-
cial and organizational support, lobbying incumbent lawmakers to pursue an industry-supported agenda,
supporting (and sometimes purchasing) scientic research likely to be favorable to industry, and organizing
broad-based public relations campaigns, sometimes through third-party actors with independent credibility.
21Stephen Pomper, \The New Drug Pushers," Shepherd Express Metro, September 14, 2000
22Stephen Pomper, \Drug Rush: Why the Prescription Drug Market is Unsafe at High Speeds," Washington Monthly, May,
2000
12In its campaign to avoid FDA regulation, the tobacco industry used all of these techniques to brilliant eect.
Since pre-colonial times, tobacco has been one of America's most protable cash crops. It remains an agri-
cultural staple; according to industry gures, the tobacco industry accounts for more than 680,000 jobs
nationwide, and in many regions is the driving force behind the local economy.23 Despite mounting evidence
of tobacco's addictive properties and health risks from the 1950s onward, the Food and Drug Administration
had never attempted to assert authority over cigarettes. For decades, the FDA acted under the assumption
that it would need a specic grant of statutory authority to assert jurisdiction over tobacco products. In
1977, Commissioner Donald Kennedy, challenged by a member of the Senate to explain why the FDA had
not regulated tobacco, responded, \Senator, I'll be glad to go to work on the cigarette ban as soon as you
give me the authority to do so."24 Commissioner David Kessler turned around the FDA's approach to
tobacco, aggressively gathering evidence and building his case. On August 28, 1996, the Food and Drug
Administration announced its controversial regulation of tobacco products, igniting a restorm of political
controversy.25 The tobacco industry called on every weapon at its disposal - chief among them its carefully
cultivated allies in the Congress.
USING THE CONGRESS
While in theory most of the FDA's decisions are made on the basis of independent scientic judgements, the
23Hank Cox, \Feds and Smokers Fume Over the Right to Inhale," The Washington Times, Apr. 24, 1995, at 14 (citing to a
1992 Price Waterhouse Study).
24David Kessler, \A Question of Intent: A Great American Battle With A Deadly Industry," PublicAairs, New York, 2001,
p.27
25See \Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and
Adolescents," 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,398 (1996)
13Agency has always been closely scrutinized by members of Congress, and the degree of support or hostility
the Congress demonstrates can have a powerful eect on internal FDA decision-making. Hutt and Merrill
note in their seminal casebook:
The [FDA] is controversial. Its decisions are closely watched. Numerous congressional committees critique
its performance, very often concluding that it has been reckless in approving new products or insuciently
vigorous in acting against old ones. The message conveyed by both the intensity and attitude of congressional
oversight has had enormous inuence on both the content of FDA's requirements and the thrust of its
enforcement eorts.26
While the statute under which the FDA operates has remained largely unchanged, the Congress controls
the FDA's budget on a year-to-year basis, has broad oversight responsibilities, and has demonstrated a
willingness to use that authority to control the FDA's regulatory agenda. The willingness of Congress to
second-guess the FDA is hardly a new development; legislative micro-management has long been a concern
of regulatory experts. Louis Rothschild wrote in 1978, \I am not criticizing the right of any segment of the
population to take its troubles to Capitol Hill, for hearings to be held, or for members of Congress to express
their views. However, I am disturbed by the threat of legislation to cut the ground out from under the FDA
if it does not do what isolated Congressmen or a powerful Congressional subcommittee tell it to do, even
though it may conict with the Agency's stated policy or mandate."27 This concern remains as vital and
relevant in 2001 as when Rothschild voiced it in 1978.
What have changed are the source of congressional dissatisfaction, and the direction of its criticism. In 1974,
FDA Commissioner Alex M. Schmidt wrote,
26Peter Barton Hutt and Richard A. Merrill, \Food and Drug Law: Cases and Materials, University Casebook Series,
Foundation Press, Westbury, NY, 1991, p.19
27Louis Rothschild, \The Newest Regulatory Agency in Washington," 33 Food Drug Cosmetic Law Journal 86 (1978), as
cited in Peter Barton Hutt and Richard A. Merrill, \Food and Drug Law: Cases and Materials, University Casebook Series,
Foundation Press, Westbury, NY, 1991, p.1317
14By far the greatest pressure that the Bureau of Drugs or the Food and Drug Administration receives with
respect to the drug approval process is brought to bear through congressional hearings. In all of our history,
we are unable to nd one instance where a congressional hearing investigated the failure of FDA to approve
a new drug. The occasions on which hearings have been held to criticize approval of a new drug have been
so frequent in the past ten years that we have not even attempted to count them.... Until perspective is
brought to the legislative oversight function, the pressure from Congress for FDA to disapprove new drugs
will continue to be felt, and could be a major factor in health care in this country.28
This sentiment would hardly be recognizable to contemporary observers of the Congress-FDA relationship.
Since Schmidt's' time, FDA-Congressional relations have undergone a profound shift.
Where FDA was once roundly criticized for insucient oversight and an overly solicitous attitude toward
the industries it regulates, contemporary Congressional criticism has lambasted FDA for being unnecessarily
adversarial in its relations with industry, and for pursuing its regulatory mission with excessive zeal. This
paradigm shift in Congressional attitudes reects a number of larger changes: shifts in public attitudes
toward government regulation, in the partisan composition of the Congress, in the mounting importance
of fundraising to political success, and in events like the HIV/AIDS crisis, which required a more exible
and adaptable Food and Drug Administration. This change in congressional attitudes is also reective, in
no small degree, to an aggressive, resourceful campaign by the American tobacco industry to deter, or if
necessary, prevent the FDA from regulating its products.
28Statement of Alex M. Schmidt, M.D., Commissioner of Food and Drugs, \Regulation of New Drug R. & D. By the Food
And Drug Administration," Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. On Health of the Senate Comm. On Labor and Public
Welfare and the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Congress,
2d Session (1974)
15THE ROLE OF CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS: PAYING THE
PIPER, CALLING THE TUNE
One of the principal means by which an industry can advance its political agenda is by supporting the electoral
campaigns of ideologically friendly candidates. Running for elected oce can be enormously expensive {
candidates for the House of Representatives routinely spend over one million dollars on their campaigns, and
candidates for the Senate frequently spend in the tens of millions. As the cost of political campaigns has
accelerated, elected ocials have found it necessary to raise ever-increasing amounts of money, and corporate
interests have proven to be a reliable source of funding. Though corporations have been prohibited from
making direct donations to candidates for federal election since 1907, when Congress passed the Tillman
Act,29 corporations still make their inuence felt, through the personal donations of industry-aliated
individuals like executives and lobbyists, through industry-aliated Political Action Committees (PACs),
and, increasingly, through unregulated \soft money" contributions, which are ostensibly for \party-building"
purposes and are donated directly to the national or state-level political parties.
Louise Overcracker wrote in her 1932 book, Money in Elections, \No party which is nancially dependent
upon the substantial business interests... would feel free to embark on an economic program which met with
their hostility. Even a dog will not bite the hand that feeds it, and a political party will hardly `sell out' the
person whose money it accepts."30 Overcracker's model is of course oversimplied; academics like Herbert
Alexander and Frank Sorauf have contended that the popular model of politicians being \bought and sold"
by campaign contributions is unsubstantiated by empirical evidence, and have emphasized the existence of
stronger correlation of legislative voting to ideology, party or constituency interests than to contributions.31
29Election Reform: Basic References United States Senate, Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities Pursuant
to S. Res. 60, 93rd Congress, 1st session, November, 1973
30Louise Overcracker, \Money in Elections," New York: Macmillan, 1932, pp. 374-375
31See Herbert Alexander, Brookings Institution Working Group on Campaign Finance Reform, 1996
16What Alexander and Sorauf ignore, however, is that campaign contributions make the bulk of their impact
in the campaigns themselves, by helping to determine who is elected, and consequently the ideology and
party aliation that most consistently determine voting behavior. And while elected representatives rarely
deviate from their core positions, campaign donations can have a signicant eect at the margins; among
uncommitted representatives, on issues that have little salience with the public, nancial support { or the
threat of its withdrawal { can be a deciding factor for a legislator. Because the individual regulatory decisions
of the FDA have little salience with the general public, but enormous nancial consequences for interested
parties, they are uniquely vulnerable to this kind of legislative inuence.
One of the key elements of the tobacco industry's legislative strategy was to maintain a broad base of
political support among the elected leaders of both parties in Congress. For many years, tobacco-producing
Southern states like North Carolina, Kentucky and Virginia were rmly in Democratic hands, and the tobacco
industry became a generous patron of Southern Democrats. As Southern states gradually gravitated toward
the Republican Party, the tobacco industry slowly shifted its political allegiances. That shift was cemented by
the 1994 change in party control of Congress, and escalated as David Kessler's FDA { with the public support
of a Democratic President { made regulation of tobacco an Agency priority. Between 1989 and 1994, when
Democrats controlled both Houses of Congress, tobacco PACs contributed nearly identical amounts of hard
money { about $3.3 million each { to Republican and Democratic candidates.32 But after the GOP assumed
control in 1994, tobacco donations shifted strongly to the new party in power; once Republicans assumed
control, the tobacco industry was intent on keeping them there. The alliance was in many ways a natural
t: the Republican Party was ascendant in tobacco states like North Carolina and Kentucky, ideologically
32\Buying Inuence, Selling Death: How Big Tobacco's Campaign Contributions Harm Public Health," Common Cause,
March 14, 2001
17opposed to federal regulation and taxation, and strongly in favor of pro-business anti-tort legislation. Today,
the tobacco industry's support is rmly behind the Republican Party, and has stayed there, even as the
Republican advantage in the Congress has slipped with each successive election cycle. In the 2000 election
cycle, the tobacco industry gave $6.3 million, or eighty-three percent of its total contributions, to Republican
candidates and committees.33
Part of the tobacco industry's campaign nance strategy was to forge friendly relationships with the lead-
ership of the major parties, those Members who set the legislative agenda in the Congress. The tobacco
industry is one of the most generous supporters of the Republican leadership, and while tobacco donations to
Democrats have tailed o, particularly in the Senate, Democratic leaders continue to attract disproportionate
attention from tobacco PACs.
Tobacco Industry Support of Congressional Leadership, 1995-200034
Senate Republican
Majority Leadership
Member Tobacco PAC
Donations,
01/01/95-11/27/00
President
Pro
Tem-
pore
of
Sen-
ate
Strom
Thur-
mond
(R-
SC)
$15,000
Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-MS) $4,500
Majority
Whip
Don
Nick-
les
(R-
OK)
$15,166
33Id.
34\Buying Inuence, Selling Death: How Big Tobacco's Campaign Contributions Harm Public Health," Common Cause,
March 14, 2001
18Republican Conference,
Chair
Rick Santorum (R-PA) $31,000
Republican
Pol-
icy
Com-
mit-
tee,
Chair
Larry
Craig
(R-
ID)
$23,000
Republican Senatorial
Committee, Chair
Bill Frist (R-TN) $15,500
Senate Democratic
Minority Leadership
Member Tobacco PAC
Donations,
01/01/95-11/27/00
Minority
Leader
Tom
Daschle
(D-
SD)
0
Minority Whip Harry Reid (D-NV) $6,500
Democratic
Con-
fer-
ence,
Chair
Tom
Daschle
(D-
SD)
0
Democratic Policy
Committee, Chair
Byron Dorgan (D-ND) 0
Democratic
Sen-
a-
to-
rial
Cam-
paign
Com-
mit-
tee,
Chair
Patty
Mur-
ray
(D-
WA)
0
House Republican
Majority Leadership
Member Tobacco PAC
Donations,
01/01/95-11/27/00
19Speaker
of
the
House
Dennis
Hastert
(R-
IL)
$9,000
House Majority Leader Dick Armey (R-TX) $35,500
House
Ma-
jor-
ity
Whip
Tom
De-
Lay
(R-
TX)
$56,500
House Republican
Conference, Chair
JC Watts (R-OK) $17,500
House
Re-
pub-
li-
can
Pol-
icy
Com-
mit-
tee,
Chair
Christopher
Cox
(R-
CA)
$14,500
House Republican
Congressional
Committee, Chair
Tom Davis (R-VA) $1,000
House Democratic
Minority
Leadership35
Member Tobacco PAC
Donations,
01/01/95-11/27/00
House
Mi-
nor-
ity
Leader
Richard
Gephardt
(D-
MO)
$23,000
House Minority Whip David Bonior (D-MI) $8,000
House
Demo-
cratic
Cau-
cus,
Chair
Martin
Frost
(D-
TX)
$32,500
35In the House of Representatives, Democratic leaders Gephardt, Bonior and Lowey have received no tobacco PAC money
since January 1, 1997.
20House Democratic
Policy Committee,
Chair
Richard Gephardt
(D-MO)
See above
Democratic
Con-
gres-
sional
Cam-
paign
Com-
mit-
tee,
Chair
Nita
Lowey
(D-
NY)
$500
In addition to seducing the leadership of the major parties, the tobacco industry's campaign nance strategy
aimed to cement friendly relations with a broad cross-section of the Congress, across regions and across
party lines. While the industry's most loyal supporters in Congress hailed from tobacco-producing Southern
states, the industry was careful to spread its largesse across the country. Between 1989 to 1994, 73 of the
Senate's 100 Members accepted campaign contributions from the tobacco industry, as did 287 of the 435
Members in the House.36 While the proportion of Members receiving tobacco contributions has declined
in recent years, as the Democratic Party has taken an increasingly anti-tobacco stance, and as accepting
tobacco money has become an increasing electoral liability, a considerable proportion of the Congress still
receives support from the tobacco industry. Nearly sixty percent of current Members of Congress received
contributions from tobacco industry PACs between 1995 and 2000.37
While publicity considerations have led it to assume a low prole in political matters, the tobacco industry
36Vicki Kemper, \The Inhalers: They May Not Smoke Tobacco Products, But Some In Congress Are Addicted to the
Industry's Money," Common Cause Magazine, Jan./ Feb./ Mar. 1995.
37\Buying Inuence, Selling Death: How Big Tobacco's Campaign Contributions Harm Public Health," Common Cause,
March 14, 2001
21has demonstrated its willingness to target individual Members who have threatened the industry's nancial
interests. Rep. Mike Synar (D-OK), who had been one of the tobacco industry's most vociferous critics
in the House, faced three opponents in a vicious Democratic primary in 1992, who were heavily funded by
tobacco interests. His opponents posted billboards along the highways of his district that depicted his face
alongside those of Adolf Hitler, Josef Stalin and Fidel Castro.38 While Synar survived the challenge in 1992,
he was weakened, and lost to another tobacco-nanced primary challenger in 1994. This willingness on the
part of the industry to lash out at troublemakers not only intimidates or eliminates an individual Member,
it sends a message to others that the industry is best kept an ally.
Just as the targeting of specic members has an expressive, as well as a functional purpose, the timing
of contributions is sometimes calculated to send a message. On February 24, 1998, the same day tobacco
executives were called to Congress to discuss the nationwide antismoking proposal, Philip Morris contributed
$100,000 to the Republicans who control the House.39 The donation was the largest the National Republican
Congressional Committee took in during the rst three months of 1998, according to documents led with
the Federal Election Commission.40
Opponents of campaign nance regulation often argue that full disclosure of contributors should provide a
sucient deterrent incentive for politicians to avoid taking money from unsavory sources. But it can be
notoriously dicult to track money to its source in industry, a fact that the following memo, a condential
inter-oce correspondence, makes clear. At the time the memo was written, Pete Wilson was the Governor
38David Kessler, \A Question of Intent: A Great American Battle With A Deadly Industry," PublicAairs, New York, 2001,
p.282
39\Tobacco Firms Gave Big to GOP Leaders," Associated Press, April 18, 1998
40Id.
22of California, considered a rising star in the Republican Party and potential presidential timber. During the
1990 election, Wilson publicly declared he would not accept campaign funds from the tobacco industry, but
later attended a Philip Morris-sponsored fundraiser that raised $100,000 for the California Republican Party.
After the fundraiser prompted an outcry, Wilson claimed he was unaware of the company's involvement.
The following memo was circulated inside Philip Morris immediately after Wilson's disavowal.
23To: Buy Date: 4/24/90
From: Jim
Subject: Pete Wilson
Wilson is only sending about 16K of the 100K he collected. This 16K includes checks he received from either
a tobacco company or anyone working directly for a tobacco company, i.e. Hamish Maxwell, Mrs. Ehud, Bill
Murray.41
Apparently, he has also done with other \controversial industries such as lumber, chemical and others.
The decision to do this was Wilson's alone, and in the [sic] response to a wave of negative campaigning in
California that not only attacks the candidates, but those who give to them as well.
You will be pleased to know that Pete called Hamish to explain that he was doing this to protect Hamish
as well as himself. You will also be pleased to know that Pete is still \pro-tobacco." 42
In the years that followed, Governor Wilson proved his status as \pro-tobacco;" he repeatedly tried to divert
funds from California's highly successful anti-smoking campaign.
41Hamish Maxwell, former CEO of Philip Morris, is the chairman of the executive committee; Mrs. Ehud is the wife of Ehud
Houminer, CEO of Philip Morris USA; Bill Murray is the former president of Philip Morris. The remaining $84,000 mentioned
in the memo remains unaccounted for.
42Peter. H. Stone, \The Wilson Memo," Mother Jones, May/June, 1996
24TOBACCO INDUSTRY LOBBYING: LEND ME YOUR EARS
While the tobacco industry is one of the most generous political givers in the country, it is an equally
prodigious lobbying inuence. Brown & Williamson spent $25 million dollars in 1998 to lobby Congress {
successfully { to oppose the McCain tobacco legislation; Philip Morris spent $23 million more. No other
business, trade association, union or citizen's group spent as much as either corporation, though other tobacco
industry organizations spent an additional $18 million. In all, the industry spent $66 million lobbying the
Congress in 1998.43
The industry is also extremely sophisticated in its employment of lobbying techniques. Because members of
Congress are frequently back home in their districts, Philip Morris actually hired friends of the legislators in
particular states and congressional districts to \deliver the Philip Morris message informally."44 Sometimes
lobbying eorts can be as unassuming as throwing a party in a Member's honor. At the Republican National
Convention in Philadelphia, U.S. Tobacco wined and dined delegates at a tribute to Senator Mitch McConnell
(R-KY) and paid for an American Bandstand party honoring Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-MS),
complete with appearances by Dick Clark and the Shirelles.45 Philip Morris and Brown & Williamson were
among the sponsors of a \Mardi Gras Goes Hollywood" party honoring Senator John Breaux (D-LA) that
was held on a Paramount Studios lot and featured Mardi Gras oats, zydeco bands, gumbo and jambalaya.46
Not all politicians feel comfortable being publicly wooed the way Sens. Lott and Breaux do, particularly by
as controversial an industry as the tobacco industry. To protect prospective allies from negative publicity,
the tobacco industry has often used front groups to lavish favors on legislators. In 1997, Philip Morris sent
43The tobacco industry spent another $40 million running television and radio advertisements attacking the McCain bill.
Senator Mitch McConnell (R-KY), a staunch supporter of the industry, promised his colleagues the advertisements would
continue even after the bill was defeated, in order to provide political cover to those Senators who stood with the industry. See
Jerey Taylor, \Is the Tobacco Industry Playing Politics With Issue Ads?" Wall Street Journal, September 1, 1998
44Ernest Wittenberg and Elizabeth Wittenberg, \How to Win in Washington: Very Practical Advice About Lobbying, the
Grassroots, and the Media. \ 2nd Edition, Blackwell, Cambridge, MA, 1994. p.46
45Al Cross, \Corporate America Gives the Red-Carpet Treatment," The Louisville-Courier Journal 3 August 2000.
46Bruce Alpert, \Despite Ban, Tobacco Filters into Parties, New Orleans Times-Picayune, 16 August 2000
25twelve state legislators (among them Je Wells, the majority leader of Colorado's state Senate, who was
then considering a run for state attorney general) on a six-day vacation in Costa Rica, where they stayed
at a luxury resort with a casino and pool bar.47 The trip was sponsored by the innocently named New
York Society for International Aairs. While that group has a Manhattan telephone number and address,
it is actually a front organization funded by Philip Morris. The president of the New York Society, Andrew
Whist, is a vice president at Philip Morris; in a rare moment of candor, he bragged to the Wall Street Journal
that the New York Society's oce is \a chair in my apartment."48 Tax records led by the Society show
that Philip Morris was nearly the exclusive donor to the non-prot organization between 1991 and 1995;
during that time the tobacco giant was responsible for $620,000, or 98% of the $631,000 in total contributions
received by the organization.49
Lobbying is not all attery and vacations. Lobbyists also play an essential role in connecting members of
Congress with campaign donors. To raise money for their campaigns, members of Congress often need to
woo lobbyists as much as lobbyists need to woo them. In the words of Tommy Boggs, one of Washington's
most famous and powerful lobbyists, \The real abuse is the amount of time these guys [members of Congress]
have to spend kissing my ass... It's ludicrous how much time these women and fellas have to spend raising
money."50
This co-dependence often translates into concrete action by members of Congress: they come to recognize
that lobbyists and legislators have a symbiotic relationship, in which each can help the other succeed. \It's
usually not put in the way of saying, `See, we want your vote next week," said Cincinnati attorney and
former congressman David Mann, a Democrat who served in the House of Representatives from 1992 to
47Scott C. Yates, \The Marlboro Hombres," Westword.com, August 27, 1997. In 1998 Wells circulated petitions to qualify
in the race for attorney general, but did not le them.
48Tatiana S. Boncompagni and Jill Abramson, Tobacco- Funded Group Gives Legislators Free Trips, The Wall Street Journal,
August 4, 1997, p. A20.
49\Thompson Was Among VIPs Who Traveled Through Groups Backed By Firm," Steve Schultze and Daniel Bice, Milwaukee
Journal-Sentinel, July 30, 1997
50\The Buying of the Congress: Transcripts," Thomas Hale Boggs, Jr., Interviewed by Chuck Lewis, Center for Public
Integrity, August 15, 1997
261994. \But you're campaigning every two years and you're under pressure to raise and spend money. Your
votes are inuenced by that if you're a human being... How you vote on this may aect your ability to raise
money," Mann said. \It's always on your mind. Anyone who says otherwise is not being truthful."51
INSIDE CONNECTIONS, TRUSTWORTHY FIGURES
Lobbying is expensive because the most persuasive and well-connected lobbyists can command enormous fees.
The tobacco industry has spent liberally to land the most credible and trustworthy gures that the Western
world had to oer. Former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher became a consultant to Philip Morris
after she left oce.52 Senator Howard Baker, (R-TN), the former Minority Leader and Majority Leader of
the Senate, and Chief of Sta to President Ronald Reagan, also became a paid advocate for Philip Morris.53
Senator Zell Miller (D-GA) actually lobbied for Philip Morris between his service as Governor of Georgia
and his ascension to the Senate.54 In addition to the personal relationships they retain from their time in
oce, former members of Congress who become lobbyists retain certain advantages in their new incarnation;
unlike other lobbyists, they are allowed on the House oor and in private dining rooms reserved for elected
ocials.55
While its campaign donations have increasingly shifted toward the Republican Party, the tobacco industry's
lobbying eorts retained a heavily bipartisan avor. In February of 1997, the ve largest tobacco companies {
51Bill Straub, \Lobbyists Practice Art of Subtle Pressure," The Cincinnati Post, July 15, 1998
52\Ms. Thatcher would be available to consult with us for an initial three-year period.. [T]he fee we would pay for those
services would consist of a $250,000 annual payment to her and a $250,000 annual contribution to the Margaret Thatcher
Foundation... we are of like mind." Michael A. Miles, PM memo July 20, 1992, PM ID 2022854068-69, at 68.
53\Senator Baker's attachment to this Company gives us an eective, high-level advocate of our policies...[I]f the Company
needs to be publicly identied in a positive way with an issue, he can do it best." Jame Dyer, PM memo to David Greenberg
and Buy Linehan, \Senator Howard Baker," June 29, 1989, PM ID 2041252693-94).
54Joshua Micah Marshall, \Zellout," The American Prospect, Volume 12, Issue 8, May 1, 2001
55Lobbyists without access to the House Floor must sometimes rely on other techniques of persuasion. Paula Parkinson, an
agricultural lobbyist, claimed to have has sex with eight dierent members of Congress. See Ken Rudin, \Congressional Sex
Scandals in History," The Washington Post, 1998
27Philip Morris, RJR Nabisco, Brown & Williamson, U.S. Tobacco, and Loews Corp. { hired Verner, Liipfert,
a powerful Washington law rm with strong Democratic ties.56 Among the Democratic luminaries who
now lobby their former colleagues for Verner, Liipfert are former Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell
(D-ME), former Gov. Ann Richards (D-TX), and former Treasury Secretary and Senator Lloyd Bentsen
(D-TX). Both Mitchell and Richards were active in lobbying Democrats on behalf of the tobacco industry.57
On the Republican side, the tobacco group hired Barbour, Grith & Rogers, a lobbying shop that boasts
as a name partner Haley Barbour, a former chairman of the Republican National Committee. More than a
few Republican members of Congress owe their seats to Barbour's fundraising prowess at the RNC.58
THE SHADOW FDA
In addition to former members of Congress, the tobacco industry's lobbyists include many attorneys pre-
viously employed in the highest legal positions at the FDA. These individuals have not only substantial
knowledge about the internal politics and machinations of the Agency, but the credibility and prestige to
publicly second-guess the decisions of the FDA.
This \Shadow FDA" includes Richard Merrill, former chief counsel during the Carter Administration and
Peter Barton Hutt, former chief counsel during the Nixon Administration, both of whom are now partners
at the Washington law rm of Covington & Burling, which has represented Philip Morris, Lorillard Tobacco
and the Tobacco Institute;59 Richard Cooper, a former associate chief counsel in the Carter Administration,
56Omar Beer and Suzanne Herel, \Loan Ocer for the Corporate Welfare State," Mother Jones, April 23, 1997
57Id.
58Even in his time at the RNC, before he was a tobacco lobbyist, Barbour was accused of whipping votes for the tobacco
industry; see p. 30.
59David Kessler, \A Question of Intent: A Great American Battle With A Deadly Industry," PublicAairs, New York, 2001,
p.337
28now a partner at the Washington law rm of Williams & Connolly, which represents R.J. Reynolds; Thomas
Scarlett, former chief counsel during the Reagan Administration; Gene Pfeifer, a former FDA lawyer, now a
partner at King & Spalding, which represents Brown & Williamson; Arthur Levine, former deputy general
counsel of litigation from 1978-91; and Donald Beers,60 former associate chief counsel for enforcement from
1978-85. Levine and Beers both have represented Philip Morris as members of the law rm of Arnold &
Porter.61 \It is astonishing. These lawyers are the experts in the eld, and they know where everything is
buried at FDA," said one FDA ocial. \When they talk to their clients, they say, 'Ask for this document,'
and they know about the document because they are the ones who wrote it."62
These lawyers not only have invaluable knowledge, they are often the unchallenged authorities in their eld
of expertise; Hutt and Merrill, for instance, literally wrote the book on Food and Drug Law.63 But the
impact of these ocials goes beyond their legal acumen. Their past government service gives them unrivaled
credibility, a quality which the tobacco industry is willing to pay for dearly. Charlie Edwards, a former
commissioner of FDA, became a consultant for Philip Morris in 1994, in part because of the credibility that
his stature and years of government service could lend to the industry's message.64 In testimony before
the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, Edwards attacked Commissioner David Kessler in
starkly personal terms: \We have yet to ensure that those who are appointed as Commissioner have the
necessary qualications for the job. Far too often, the wrong person is in charge because it is easy but
very wrong to assume that a medical degree or a prior post in academia is all that is needed to run this
agency."65 Many of Edwards' statements matched verbatim the remarks prepared by Philip Morris media
60See Milo Geyelin, \Tobacco Industry Gets Help From Ex- FDA Lawyers," The Wall Street Journal, January 16, 1995.
61David Kessler, \A Question of Intent: A Great American Battle With A Deadly Industry," PublicAairs, New York, 2001,
p.143
62Robert Dreyfuss, \Tobacco Enemy Number One," Mother Jones, 1997
63See Peter Barton Hutt and Richard A. Merrill, \Food and Drug Law: Cases and Materials, University Casebook Series,
Foundation Press, Westbury, NY, 1991
64Charles R. Wall, PM memo to Steve Parrish, \Retainer Fee for Dr. Charles Edwards," May 20, 1994, PM ID 2047710586
65Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, testimony of Charles C. Edwards, hearing, The FDA and the Future
of American Biomedical and Food Industries, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., April 5 and 6, 1995
29experts.66 Edwards had been wooed by $125,000 in consulting fees and by Philip Morris' proposal to build
a scientic research center at Scripps Research Institute in La Jolla, California, where Edwards had served
as president.67
FLEXING TOBACCO'S MUSCLES: THE CONGRESSIONAL ASSAULT ON KESSLER'S
FDA
It should come as no surprise that members of Congress who hail from tobacco-producing districts are
vigorous supporters of the industry, who are willing, even enthusiastic about standing up for a valued
corporate constituent. But supporting tobacco interests is politically risky for many members of Congress
whose districts don't depend on tobacco for their vitality. In extreme cases, supporters of the tobacco
industry have been called on to armatively cast votes to protect their patrons. This is, however, a last
resort, as it exposes both the industry group and their allies in Congress to criticism. More often, recipients
of tobacco industry funds earn their keep through simply maintaining the status quo. The activist FDA of
Commissioner David Kessler, with its aggressive eort to bring the tobacco industry under FDA jurisdiction,
made the status quo approach unsustainable; industry leaders felt forced to call in chits from the entire
panoply of political allies in an all-out assault on Kessler and his Agency. The tobacco industry's campaign
against the Food and Drug Administration encompassed not only roll-call votes to deny granting the Agency
jurisdiction over tobacco, but also casting aspersions on the leadership of the FDA and on the agency itself.
Congressional recipients of tobacco industry largesse acted to attack FDA's integrity, its physical plant, its
budget, and its statutory mandate.
66The documents that matched Edwards' testimony were PM ID 2044771450-54 and PM ID 2044771477-49. Edwards would
admit only that he \ran it through" executives at Philip Morris.
67David Kessler, \A Question of Intent: A Great American Battle With A Deadly Industry," PublicAairs, New York, 2001,
p.315
30ROLL-CALL VOTES: WINNING WHEN IT COUNTS
When necessary, the tobacco industry has been able to muster enough support in the Congress to win roll-
call votes, even when the industry's position is disfavored by the general public. National polls show that a
substantial majority of registered voters support strong action to address youth smoking; three out of four
voters support granting the FDA authority over the manufacture, marketing and sale of tobacco products,
and support lawsuits against the industry.68 Support for FDA regulation of tobacco crosses political and
demographic lines, as overwhelming majorities of Democrats (eighty-one percent), Republicans (seventy-
two percent) and independent voters (seventy-two percent) favored legislation that would grant the FDA
authority to regulate tobacco products. Even a lopsided majority of smokers (sixty-seven percent) felt that
Congress should pass a bill establishing FDA authority.69
Nevertheless, in July of 1997, the House and Senate defeated eorts to fund enforcement of the Food and
Drug Administration's initiative to prevent illegal tobacco sales to minors. On July 23, 52 senators voted
against funding; they received, on average, nearly three times the tobacco PAC contributions in the two
years before their last election as the 48 senators who supported the funding ($14,884 vs. $5,223). In the
corresponding House vote on July 24, 248 Members voting against the funding; they had taken, on average,
nearly ve times as much tobacco PAC money in the previous cycle as the 177 Members who voted to fund
the compliance checks ($5,636 vs. $1,142).70
In June of 1998, allies of the tobacco industry in the U.S. Senate defeated the comprehensive tobacco
legislation sponsored by Senator John McCain (R-AZ). The bill was defeated by libuster on June 17, 1998,
when supporters of the bill could muster only 57 of the 60 Senators needed to end debate and bring the bill
68Market Facts' Tele Nation conducted a random national survey of 864 registered voters February 2 through February 4,
2001. The survey has a margin of error of +/- 3.5 percentage points.
69Id.
70\Buying Inuence, Selling Death: How Big Tobacco's Campaign Contributions Harm Public Health," Common Cause,
March 14, 2001
31to a nal vote. The 42 senators who voted to kill the McCain bill received, on average, $17,902 in the two
years before their last election; the 57 senators who supported the bill received an average of $4,810.71
In 1999, Congress refused to appropriate the $20 million requested by the Justice Department to fund the
lawsuit. The Justice Department then sought funding through a provision of federal law allowing litigation
assistance from other aected departments, including the Departments of Defense, Veterans Aairs and
Health and Human Services. In June of 2000, the U.S. House of Representatives voted twice on whether
to deny that alternative avenue of funding. On the rst vote, on June 19, industry supporters carried the
day, 207-197; the 207 industry allies had received, on average, ve times as much tobacco PAC money in the
previous two election cycles as the 197 who voted to continue funding ($9,712 vs. $1,750). On a subsequent
vote, on June 23, supporters of the suit won a majority, 215-183. Members who voted to cut o funding
had taken, on average, nearly seven times as much tobacco PAC money in the previous two cycles as the
Members who supported funding for the lawsuit ($10,715 vs. $1,539).72 Eorts to kill the lawsuit also failed
in the Senate, where the issue did not come to a oor vote.
When hard-money donations are an insucient incentive, the role of soft-money donations to the political
parties can also increase pressure on reluctant members of Congress to support party-line votes. In 1996,
at the peak of the partisan rancor surrounding the FDA's role in tobacco regulation, the chairman of the
Republican National Committee, Haley Barbour, was accused of exerting pressure on Republican members
of Congress from Texas and Arizona to support industry-sponsored legislation. Barbour said he made the
Arizona calls to check on the legislation but denied exerting pressure. \I'm not in the business of pressuring
anybody, in Congress or anywhere else," he said.73
71Id.
72Id.
73\Clinton: RNC Exerted Pro-Tobacco Pressure," Reuters News Service, July 5, 1996. These comments were made before
he became a lobbyist for the tobacco industry, at which point his job became, literally, the business of pressuring members of
Congress or anybody else.
32CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES AND THE OVERSIGHT FUNCTION
Because of the structure of the committee system in Congress, some Congressmen are uniquely positioned to
help { or hurt { a given industry. The Chairman of a Committee or Subcommittee can bottle-up legislation
and keep it from reaching the Floor, or he can ensure that it has been neutered by the amendment process.
As a result, even an industry that is unpopular with the general public can be eectively protected by a
well-placed supporter in Congress. While it has proven its ability to muster a wide base of support in the
Congress when necessary, the industry has preferred to make its inuence felt through the discretion of
strategically placed allies in the leadership. This low-visibility strategy preserves the industry's political
capital for when it is most crucial, and protects allies in the Congress from more criticism than is necessary.
For all these reasons, Rep. Thomas J. Bliley Jr., (R-VA) is the perfect ally for the tobacco industry. Chairman
of the House Commerce Committee, which oversees the FDA, Bliley hails from a Richmond district that
is home to a major Philip Morris plant; virtually no action he takes on behalf of the tobacco industry
could threaten his base of political support in his district. Bliley has received so much tobacco money, and
fought on behalf of the industry so vigorously, that he has earned the moniker \the congressman from Philip
Morris." Philip Morris agreed: in 1986, before Bliley assumed the chairmanship himself, an internal Philip
Morris document referred to him as \our sentry" on the Health and the Environment subcommittee.74 And
that feeling was no secret: after Bliley replaced Rep. Henry Waxman (D-CA) as chairman, Philip Morris
CEO Georey Bible wrote a letter to shareholders in which he wrote that \new faces and new leadership on
Capitol Hill [give us] tremendous opportunities to get new and unbiased hearings on the issues that concern
74Gregory R. Scott, PM memo to Gene A. Knorr, \Rebuilding Our Relationship With Tobacco-State Congressmen," August
25, 1986, PM ID 2025854686-89.
33us most."75
In 1996, the RJ Reynolds Tobacco Company sponsored a reception in Bliley's honor at the Republican
Nominating Convention in San Diego. Asked to explain the attention, Bliley joked, \I guess they think I'm
a great American."76 When he was pressed as to whether RJR was trying to inuence him, Bliley denied
that they would have to, replying proudly, \I've been a defender of the tobacco industry since being elected
to Congress."77
Bliley used his chairmanship to aggressively pursue FDA Commissioner David Kessler, often making un-
reasonable, even impossible requests of FDA ocials. One letter demanding documents, dated March 18,
1994, arrived at FDA headquarters March 21; the closing line of the letter read, \Please provide this in-
formation to my oce no later than March 21, 1994." The letter itself later proved to be a direct product
of tobacco industry strategizing; internal Philip Morris documents from the time list a \letter to Kessler
from Bliley" as a top priority.78 Such document requests are often used by hostile Members to tie up the
bureaucracy; Rep. Charlie Rose (D-NC) actually submitted document requests drafted by outside counsel
to RJ Reynolds.79 \Anytime there's an enforcement action or any policy or regulation deemed controversial
in the eyes of Republicans, they can slam the FDA with a massive document subpoena and hold hearings
on it," an anonymous FDA ocial said. \It's an incredible waste of time."80
75See Ken Silverstein, \Washington on $10 Million a Day," Common Courage Press, 1998, p.113
76T. Whitley, \Tobacco Plays Host for Bliley Reception," Richmond (Virginia) Times-Dispatch, August 12, 1996
77Id.
78Action Team, PM notes, March 16, 1994, PM ID 2022838682-83.
79\This is what is being sent to Rep. Rose for his review and, hopefully, transmittal to the FDA." Arnold & Porter, fax cover
sheet with draft letter attached, June 7, 1994, RJR ID 515786099-107.
80Richard Blow, \10 Ways the Republicans Will Change Your Life," Mother Jones, 1995
34ATTACKING THE FDA'S INTEGRITY
Bliley's public attacks on Commissioner Kessler were often scathing. As Kessler sat before the Subcommittee
on Health and the Environment, Bliley launched into an ad hominem attack. \I was saddened by what took
place in this room a couple of weeks ago," Bliley said. \I witnessed the Commissioner of the FDA, who is
both a trained scientist and a lawyer, take threads of truth and weave them into whole cloth of rumor and
innuendo."81 Bliley was sending a message: he would ght tooth and nail to protect the tobacco industry
from regulation. A staer for Rep. Charlie Rose (D-NC), a tobacco industry ally, privately warned Kessler
that \[Bliley's] preparing to send investigators all over the Agency looking for dirt... [the t]obacco industry's
goal is to dismantle FDA."82
Bliley wasn't the only tobacco ally in the Congress to impugn the integrity of the FDA and its leadership, or
even the most prominent. Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich labeled the FDA the \number one job-killer"
in the country, and called David Kessler, \a bully and a thug."83 Later Gingrich added, \I think the FDA is a
bureaucracy that has overreached on a number of fronts. It is weakening American job creations, weakening
the introduction of new medications."84 During his campaign for the presidency, Senator Bob Dole (R-
KS) aggressively criticized Kessler; at a GOP fundraiser in September of 1995, Dole actually promised an
audience of pharmaceutical executives that Kessler would be out of a job if he were elected.85
Rep. Joe Barton (R-TX), the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, accused
Mitch Zeller, Kessler's Deputy Associate Commissioner for Policy, of committing perjury.86 Where Tom
81David Kessler, \A Question of Intent: A Great American Battle With A Deadly Industry," PublicAairs, New York, 2001,
p.171
82Id. at 289
83Nicholas Regush, \Migraine Killer," Mother Jones, 1995
84See Jeanne Cummings, \Preventative Care Gains Support; But Gingrich Rejects Targeting Tobacco," Atlanta J. & Const.,
Sept. 26, 1996, at 12A
85Sheila Kaplan, \Tobacco Dole," Mother Jones, May/June, 1996
86David Kessler, \A Question of Intent: A Great American Battle With A Deadly Industry," PublicAairs, New York, 2001,
p.346. A tobacco executive later admitted the strategy behind the accusation to Kessler: \If you need to create a diversion
because you don't want the agency [FDA] involved, attack the agency. Throw everything at the wall and something will stick."
35Bliley openly admitted his advocacy for the industry, Barton denied that tobacco played any role in his
hostile attitude toward the FDA and its sta. On national television, Barton pulled out a Bible and told
ABC's Peter Jennings, \This is the Holy Bible. I'm a United Methodist. I swear on everything I hold dear to
this country, and to my family and to my God, that my concern about FDA reform and my responsibilities
and duties have nothing to do whatsoever with tobacco."87 When pressed with the fact that he had received
donations from RJR, Brown & Williamson, Philip Morris, U.S. Tobacco, the Tobacco Institute, and Nabisco,
Barton declared, \I've never had anybody directly relating a tobacco issue in this oce." Internal Philip
Morris reports seem to contradict this statement; they show that tobacco lobbyists \secured scheduling" of
two congressional hearings, one of which was Barton's.88
PUTTING WORDS IN THE MOUTHS OF CONGRESS
Reps. Bliley and Barton were not alone in their willingness to carry out the industry's agenda. At times, the
relationship between industry patrons and their \friends" in Congress is so close that the public relations sta
of the corporations can literally put words into the mouths of Congress. At a June 21, 1994 hearing, Rep.
Michael Bilirakis (R-FL), among others, peppered Commissioner David Kessler and his sta with elaborate
hypotheticals, reading verbatim from a script provided by R.J. Reynolds.89 Philip Morris actually wrote
talking points for Reps. Martin Lancaster (D-NC) and James Clyburn (D-SC) to read into the congressional
record on its behalf.90 Shortly after Lancaster's testimony, Philip Morris sent around an internal e-mail to
87ABC News Report with Peter Jennings, June 27, 1996.
88See David Nicoli, Philip Morris memo, \Weekly Direct Report," October 20, 1995, PM ID 2047993169-72. This memo
includes the notation \secured scheduling of two FDA oversight hearings at House O&I [Oversight and Investigations], in
November, including one where Kessler will appear." Oversight and Investigations was Rep. Barton's Committee.
89David Kessler, \A Question of Intent: A Great American Battle With A Deadly Industry," PublicAairs, New York, 2001,
p.249
90Kathleen Linehan, PM memo to Robert Reese and Gregory Scott, \Waxman FDA hearing," March 17, 1994, PM ID
2023029473.
36its executives, suggesting that they contribute to Lancaster's campaign fund: \It is suggested that you give
$200-250 and that you send a letter with the check indicating that you are an executive of PM."91
HIGH-PRESSURE LETTER-WRITING CAMPAIGNS
Not every elected ocial is as useful an ally as a Chairman Bliley. But even those elected ocials who
lack a strategic perch on an inuential committee can still be valuable assets. Internal documents show how
important Philip Morris felt it was to have public ocials deliver their message directly to the FDA, to create
the impression of massive resistance by political authorities. An internal Philip Morris e-mail dated from
October, 1995, described a state-by-state \FDA project." The message, from a Philip Morris executive to
employees in the eld, suggested, \... the objective is to submit at least 10 quality letters per state primarily
from elected ocials... you know your state assignments." 92 Shortly thereafter, three of the four top
Republican leaders in the House of Representatives { Majority Whip Tom DeLay (R-TX), Majority Leader
Dick Armey (R-TX) and House Republican Conference chairman John Boehner (R-OH) { signed a letter in
December of 1995 opposing the FDA's proposed regulation of tobacco. So did Senate Majority Leader Bob
Dole. The letter was also signed by some prominent Democrats, including Senate Minority Leader Thomas
A. Daschle (D-SD) and Sen. Sam Nunn (D-GA).93
The same pattern occurred the next year, when 124 members of the House sent a sharply worded letter to the
91Ellen Merlo, PM memo to Fred Laux, et al., \Lancaster Contribution," April 19, 1994, PM ID 2041166362.
92Liam Pleven, \How Big Tobacco Courted Senator/Lobbyists Targeted Lack in FDA Fight," Newsday, September 6, 1999
93Peter H. Stone, \Blowing Smoke at its Critics," National Journal, April 20, 1996
37FDA, claiming the agency's tobacco proposal would put 10,000 jobs at risk and \trample First Amendment
rights to advertise legal products to adults." Two weeks later, 32 senators signed a virtually identical letter.94
Those senators who signed the letter had received an average of $31,368 from tobacco, compared to $11,819
for those senators who did not sign. The House signatories had received an average of $19,446, almost three
times the $6,728 that non-signing members had received.95
A similar eort took place at the state level. Though the threat from the FDA was in theory a federal
problem, the tobacco industry has taken to heart the adage of former Speaker of the House Tip O'Neill
that \all politics is local." Keenly aware that state-level ocials provide the feeder system for members of
Congress, industry representatives have carefully cultivated relationships with governors and state legislators.
According to data compiled by the National Institute on Money in State Politics and by the Virginia Public
Access Project, tobacco interests have given more than $5.4 million to state candidates and political parties
since 1995.96
Tobacco interests are major donors to the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), a group of about
3,000 conservative state legislators committed to ghting excise tax increases; Philip Morris and RJR actually
sit on the Council's board of directors. Philip Morris gives the group about $50,000 per year; RJR about
$25,000; and UST about $15,000.97 Philip Morris also contributes to the bipartisan National Conference of
State Legislatures, a group of more than 7,000 state legislators. In 1995, Philip Morris gave $150,000 for
the group's annual meeting, doubling its 1994 contribution.98 This largesse was well rewarded. An Oct. 4,
1995, newsletter cited with approval the view of the Smokeless Tobacco Council that FDA regulation would
amount to an \agency power grab" that \outs Congress's steadfast refusal to give FDA jurisdiction over
tobacco." The newsletter urged ALEC members to write to the FDA to voice their opposition to proposed
94Robert Dreyfuss, \Tobacco Enemy Number One," Mother Jones, 1997
95Id.
96See Campaign Finance Information Center, www.campaignnance.org
97Peter H. Stone, \Our Good Friend, the Governor," Mother Jones, May/June, 1996
98Id.
38regulation.99
Philip Morris wasn't content to rely on the exhortations of ALEC; the company also organized state legislators
on its own behalf to rally against the FDA's proposed regulation. One of company's targets was Sen. James
Lack (R-East Northport), a New York State legislator who was president of the National Conference of State
Legislatures, a nationwide organization.100 Philip Morris courted both Lack and the NCSL, contributing
to Lack's campaign, taking Lack and his aides to dinner, and sponsoring NCSL events in Milwaukee and
Atlanta. In November of 1995, less than a month after Philip Morris's chief lobbyist in Albany treated Lack,
his wife and two sta members to dinner, Lack wrote an impassioned letter to the FDA, drawing heavily
on arguments contained in internal Philip Morris documents. Lack signed the letter in his dual capacity as
both NCSL president and as a state senator, denouncing the FDA for overreaching its statutory mandate.101
State legislators in North Carolina were even more forceful in their protest. After David Kessler was invited
to the University of North Carolina to speak about tobacco control issues, some state legislators actually
threatened to cut o funding to the state's agship university.102
FRIENDLY GOVERNORS
The tobacco industry has made similar eorts to elect and support \friendly" governors, and to enlist
their aid against the FDA. Both Philip Morris and R.J. Reynolds are members of the elite board of the
Republican Governor's Association; each contributes approximately $40,000 annually to the group.103 On
February 5, 1996, Georey Bible, the CEO of Philip Morris, chaired a dinner for the Republican Governors
99Peter H. Stone, \Blowing Smoke at its Critics," National Journal, April 20, 1996
100Liam Pleven, \How Big Tobacco Courted Senator/Lobbyists Targeted Lack in FDA Fight," Newsday, September 6, 1999
101Id.
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39Association in Washington that raised a record-breaking $2.6 million.104 Philip Morris underwrote the event
with a $100,000 contribution, while Bible delivered a speech extolling the economic benets of the tobacco
industry.105 Just eleven days after the dinner, Gov. Kirk Fordice (R-MS), made the unusual move of ling
suit against his own state's attorney general. Fordice's suit alleged that Michael Moore, who in 1994 had
been the rst state attorney general in the country to le suit against the industry to recoup Medicaid costs,
had exceeded his legal authority.106
In November of 1995, at the annual Republican Governor's Association meeting in Nashua, New Hampshire,
tobacco lobbyists pressured governors to lobby the FDA on their behalf.107 Tobacco lobbyist Kerry Paulsen
reminded one North Dakota ocial that his company, UST (formerly U.S. Tobacco), had long supported
Gov. Edward Schafer (R-ND) and that 1996 was an election year. When asked if he was threatening to
withhold his company's nancial support, Paulsen said, \I'd never do that," but added, \You know we have
PAC money, we like the governor, and we want him to be re-elected."108 Governor Schafer heard the message
loud and clear; like many other governors who attended the Nashua meeting, he ultimately signed and sent
out under his own name a letter drafted by tobacco industry lawyers.
In addition to the North Dakota letter, the FDA received letters opposing tobacco regulation from governors
or lieutenant governors in Kentucky, South Carolina, Connecticut, Montana, and Mississippi.109 Many of
these letters bear signs of having been adapted from the same source as the North Dakota letter: tobacco
industry lawyers and lobbyists. In a letter to the FDA dated November 26, 1995, Lt. Gov. Eddie J. Briggs
of Mississippi (R-MS) wrote:
In his August 10 speech, President Clinton stated that he was authorizing federal action against tobacco
104Id.
105Peter H. Stone, \Blowing Smoke at its Critics," National Journal, April 20, 1996. Fordice's suit was unsuccessful.
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108Id.
109Id.
40products `to protect the young people of the United States.' This insinuates that I and the other members
of the Mississippi government cannot look out for the well-being of our children, and that we therefore must
rely on the paternal hand of our federal government. I resent the implication that Mississippi is unable to
care for its children.
41A letter from Lt. Gov. Dennis Rehberg (R-MT), dated December 25, 1995, said much the same thing:
In authorizing this federal action, President Clinton said he did so `to protect young people of the United
States.' This statement implies that we here in Montana cannot look out for the well-being of our own
children, and therefore must rely on assistance from the omnipresent federal government. Quite frankly, I
resent this implication, and I rmly reject this unwarranted federal intrusion into our business.110
In another letter, dated January 2, 1996, Gov. David M. Beasley (R-SC) wrote:
First of all, I must be clear on one basic point. I do not recognize FDA authority to regulate tobacco
products. The FDA repeatedly has declared that it lacks jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products as
traditionally marketed. Now the FDA has reversed course and asserted jurisdiction where it has none.111
This portion bears a striking resemblance to part of the letter from Lt. Gov. Briggs of Mississippi:
Before discussing the proposed regulations, I need to be clear about one basic point. Do not take my
participation to mean that I recognize FDA authority to regulate the sale, distribution, marketing and
advertising of tobacco products. I do not. For decades, the FDA has declared that it lacks jurisdiction to
regulate tobacco products as traditionally marketed. Now, however, the FDA simply has reversed course. I
cannot accept this display of federal arrogance. The regulations must be withdrawn.112
While an ocial who serves the governor of North Dakota admits his governor's letter was written by a
tobacco industry lawyer, the others continue to deny that they were inuenced. \There's no connection
between my letter and the tobacco industry," claims Montana Lt. Gov. Dennis R. Rehberg. \I stand on the
principle of individual responsibility."113 Rehberg has since been elected to the House of Representatives -
with the aid of $26,500 in contributions from the tobacco industry.114
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111Id.
112Id.
113Id.
114See The Center for Responsive Politics, Dennis Rehberg, Top Industries, available at
http://www.opensecrets.org/politicians/indus/N00004645.htm
42THREATENING THE FDA BUDGET
When veiled threats and angry letters are insucient, members of Congress have other tools with which to
protect their industry patrons from the Food and Drug Administration. One of the most powerful of these
is Congress' control over the purse strings of the federal government. Often the mere existence of this power
is sucient to deter cautious bureaucrats from oending the Congress. But as David Kessler's FDA moved
forward with its plan to regulate tobacco, industry-friendly members of Congress made that threat a reality,
punishing the Commissioner by attacking the FDA's budget.
In particular, tobacco-industry allies in Congress saw an opportunity to send the FDA's leadership a message
by attacking a signature spending program. Kessler was intent on moving the FDA to a unied, more modern
headquarters; for years it had been spread across forty-eight buildings in twenty dierent locations around
Washington, D.C.115 The need for a new headquarters was clear.116 But while there had been a bipartisan
consensus in favor of the appropriations in 1992, the FDA's challenge to the tobacco industry had created
new opposition. The new headquarters became a symbol, and a rallying point for opposition to the FDA.
Rep. John Duncan (R-TN) called the headquarters \a Taj Mahal," while others referred to the project as
\Kessler's Castle."117
Testifying against the new headquarters, C. Boyden Gray, former White House Counsel to President George
H. W. Bush and chairman of the conservative (and tobacco-funded) thinktank Citizens for a Sound Economy,
actually suggested that the FDA might be best eliminated altogether:
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43The 104th Congress is currently in the process of identifying and eliminating federal agencies that have either
outlived their usefulness, or whose mission can be best accomplished at the state level. Breaking ground on
a government construction project of this magnitude is shortsighted { especially until the future of the FDA
can be dened by the new Congress.118
Shortly thereafter, Rep. Duncan proposed an amendment to strike the funds for FDA construction from
appropriations legislation; it carried by a vote of 278-146.119 As David Nicoli, a Philip Morris strategist,
noted approvingly in an internal email, \tobacco was NOT mentioned" during the entire debate.120
Some industry allies took their campaign even further. Rep. Jim Bunning (R-KY) actually proposed an
amendment to strike all funding for the FDA altogether, crowing that the FDA \was a rogue agency and
Congress needs to slap it down."121 He was ultimately convinced to withdraw the amendment by embarrassed
Republican colleagues. However ridiculous his behavior appeared to his peers, it did not hinder his political
career in Kentucky, one of the nation's largest tobacco-producing states. Bunning ascended to the Senate in
1998, with more funding from the tobacco industry than all but one other member of the Senate.122
AGGRESSIVE \REFORM" PLANS: EVISCERATING THE FDA
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44An alternate method of protecting the tobacco industry from the FDA is to change the structure of the
regulatory process, constraining the powers of the agency under the guise of FDA \reform." In the wake of
Commissioner Kessler's eort to regulate tobacco, numerous tobacco-supported thinktanks released plans to
pare down FDA's responsibilities and to reassign FDA functions to private actors in an eort to eviscerate
the Agency. Ever-conscious of public relations ramications, the tobacco industry's front groups were careful
to couch the \reform" plans in terms that emphasized life-saving medicines and devices, and neatly avoided
the central role the tobacco industry played in the \reform" eort.
On February 7, 1996, the Progress & Freedom Foundation (PFF) released a report entitled \Advancing
Medical Innovation: Health, Safety and the Role of Government in the 21st Century," during a conference
attended by Rep. Thomas Bliley (R-VA). Rep. Bliley endorsed the PFF report and promised that his
committee would begin holding hearings on reforming FDA beginning in late February.123 The Progress
& Freedom Foundation's plan would place responsibility for drug development, testing, and review in the
hands of government-licensed \drug (or device) certifying bodies," or DCBs, private rms hired by the drug
companies themselves. According to the proposal, \competition between rms would inevitably produce
a lower-cost, faster, and higher-quality development and approval process."124 While the FDA would still
exist, and would theoretically retain a veto power over new products, the PFF plan would have created \a
strong presumption that private certication decisions would not be overturned without substantial cause."
Further, the FDA would not be authorized to request additional testing or data, and it would \have to
exercise its veto within a xed time period (e.g., 90 days) after which the drug would automatically receive
FDA approval."125 The result would be an almost irresistible pressure on the FDA.
The PFF's call for FDA privatization was echoed by Henry Miller, a former director of the FDA's Oce
123Legislative and Regulatory Overview, McKenna & Cuneo, L.L.P. Client Bulletin, March 1996
124Nicholas Regush, \Migraine Killer," Mother Jones, 1995
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45of Biotechnology, has been a persistent critic of the agency. Now a Senior Research Fellow at the Hoover
Institution, a conservative public policy thinktank that receives funding from the tobacco industry, Miller
is aliated with a numerous anti-regulation organizations, including the American Council on Science and
Health (ACSH). In To America's Health: A Proposal to Reform the Food and Drug Administration, Miller
argues that \The current system of drug regulation is, literally, overkill and works against the public interest,"
and contends that \attempts at regulatory reform have been weak, undermined by the absence of any
constituency that demands improvements in our regulatory system."126 In Miller's conception, \The seminal
change would be that day-to-day oversight of drug testing and review of the initial application for marketing
approval would be performed by nongovernmental, FDA-certied entities."127
The Heritage Foundation, which has long received substantial tobacco funding, came out with a similarly
aggressive privatization approach. \Whenever a drug or medical device is kept o the market for extended
periods of time, or the cost of a drug or medical device is articially heightened by overregulation, Americans
are dying or being forced to suer the unintended consequences of excessive FDA regulation." 128
To the major players in the pharmaceutical industry, however, the FDA is not simply an adversary, but
also an important seal of approval, one that reassures consumers and bolsters the public's faith in the
safety of its products. They are far less enthusiastic than their tobacco industry colleagues about the
prospecting of starving { much less eliminating { the FDA. Steve Berchem of the Pharmaceutical Research
and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) said that while some drug reviews can be handled by the private
sector, it would be a mistake to weaken the FDA's authority over product approvals. \We need an FDA
126\New Books from Hoover Fellows: To America's Health: A Proposal to Reform the Food and Drug Administration,"
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46that maintains public condence," Berchem says.129 Said one FDA ocial in 1997, \The drug companies are
happier than they have been in 10 years."130 Tom Lenard, the Progress & Freedom Foundation's director
of regulatory studies, admitted as much: \The drug companies are not particularly radical. Our proposal is
beyond where most of them seem to want to go."131 Nor was the medical device industry calling for drastic
structural changes. \The device industry doesn't want to see the FDA go away or be weakened," said Jim
Benson, senior vice president of the Health Industry Manufacturers Association (HIMA).132
Who, then, was behind radical eorts to restructure the FDA, if not the pharmaceutical and medical device
industries those plans claimed to benet? \If you look at the people who are pushing for reform of the
FDA," says one FDA ocial, \behind the scenes you will see the tobacco industry."133
THE OUTSIDE GAME: SHAPING PUBLIC OPINION
All of these eorts { aggressive oversight eorts, threats to the budget, \reform" of the decision-making
structure, bullying FDA sta { are \inside" strategies for constraining FDA. But industry strategists are
savvy enough to realize that no matter how much lobbying they do, public opinion remains a signicant
check on the ability of any interest group to advance its agenda. Accordingly, the tobacco industry has
aggressively pursued a campaign to shape public opinion outside the Capitol { an \outside" game to match
its \inside" approach.
129Nicholas Regush, \Migraine Killer," Mother Jones, 1995
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47Some members of Congress, like former Rep. Mike Synar (D-OK) or Sen. Dick Durbin (D-IL) oppose the
tobacco industry for ideological reasons; the only way to stie their voices is to remove them from oce.
Tobacco industry loyalists like Sens. Mitch McConnell (R-KY) and Jesse Helms (R-NC) are equally un-
shakable in their support for the industry. Between these two polar positions lie the vast majority of the
members of Congress. While they may have personal opinions on the subject, their position on tobacco reg-
ulation is shaped largely by political realities, by the risks and rewards oered by assuming one position over
another. While many political decisions are the product of backroom deals and fundraising considerations,
many others are determined in the home districts of the wavering Members, in the hearts and minds of their
constituents. Public opinion remains a signicant constraint on legislative action, and the tobacco industry,
keenly aware of this fact, has positioned itself to take maximum advantage.
The tobacco industry has had two primary goals in pursuing this \Outside Game:" to create the illusion of
scientic uncertainty surrounding the health eects of tobacco use, and to link in the minds of voters FDA
regulation of tobacco (which most voters favor) with the expansion of an overbearing bureaucracy and free-
spending federal government (which most voters oppose). To achieve these ends, the tobacco industry has
pursued an unprecedented public relations campaign, using front groups, advertising, promotional schemes,
and even direct dissemination of industry disinformation.
\GRASSROOTS" AND \ASTROTURF"
Professional lobbyists like George Mitchell and Haley Barbour may be personally persuasive, but to convince
wavering members of Congress that a given position is politically viable, an industry must convince Members
48that the voters in their district support { or at least will not oppose { the industry's position. To do
this, industry lobbyists have employed what they euphemistically call \grassroots" organizing, and what
skeptics refer to as \Astroturf" { the eort to make a narrow corporate agenda appear to have broad-
based support among voters. Using specially tailored mailing lists, eld ocers, telephone banks and the
latest in information technology, public relations rms are able to generate hundreds of telephone calls and
thousands of pieces of mail to elected ocials, creating the impression of wide public support for their client's
position. In 1995, Bob Beckel, once the manager of Walter Mondale's 1984 presidential campaign and now a
Washington lobbyist, organized a \grassroots" lobbying campaign on behalf of large long-distance telephone
companies that generated more than 500,000 telegrams to members of Congress. Ultimately as many as
half proved to be faked; some had been sent on behalf of people who were dead.134 Campaign and Elections
magazine reported in mid-1995 that some $790 million dollars had been spent on \grassroots" telemarketing
campaigns over the previous two years { a jump of seventy percent.135
One expert in creating grassroots support for corporations is John Davies, whose print advertisements
features a picture of an old lady carrying a sign bearing the legend \Not in my backyard." The caption
below reads:
Don't leave your future in her hands. Traditional lobbying is no longer enough. Today numbers count. To
win in the hearing room, you must reach out to create grassroots support. To outnumber your opponents,
call the leading grassroots public aairs communications specialists.136
At a 1994 conference of public relations professionals entitled \Shaping Public Opinion: If You Don't Do It,
Someone Else Will," Davies explained how his operation produced authentic-looking letters for \grassroots"
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49campaigns:
We want to assist them with letter writing. We get them on the phone, and while we're on we say `Will you
write a letter?' `Sure.' `Do you have the time to write it?' `Not really.' `Could we write the letter for you?
I could put you on the phone right now with someone who could help you write a letter. Just hold, we have
a writer standing by.' We hand-write it on `little kitty cat stationary' if its an old lady. If it's a business
we take it over to be photocopied on someone's letterhead. [We] use dierent stamps, dierent envelopes..
Getting a pile of personalized letters that have a dierent look to them is what you want to strive for.137
In this way, Davies proudly relates, he is able to create the impression of a \spontaneous explosion of
community support for needy corporations."138
The tobacco has industry used this method to great eect. As early as 1986, Philip Morris had assembled
a database of almost three million customers that it used to generate phone calls and letters to elected
ocials.139 Philip Morris launched the National Smokers Alliance (NSA) in 1993 with an estimated $4
million in seed money, and contributed a total of $42 million to the NSA between 1993 and 1996.140 Publicly,
the NSA claimed it sought to \empower" smokers. In private, industry strategists expressed concern that
\empowerment" not go too far:
The issue of 'empowerment of smokers' was viewed as somewhat dangerous. We don't want to 'empower'
them to the point that they'll quit.141
The tobacco industry's letter-writing campaign was highly eective: between the FDA's August 1995 decision
to regulate tobacco as a drug and January 1996, when the ocial period for public comment on the plan
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50ended, the Agency received nearly 700,000 pieces of mail, most of them strongly condemning the FDA's
action.142 \The tobacco companies think it will have some psychological eect on the FDA, on the courts,
and on Congress," said Alan Morrison, an attorney with the consumer advocacy group Public Citizen.
\These guys are used to sparing no expense. This is war."143
In March of 1994, a hidden camera belonging to an ABC crew captured Elizabeth Gallagher, an RJR
employee who organized \smokers' rights" groups around the country, explaining the industry strategy. \A
politician will not listen to you if they think all you are is a mouthpiece for the tobacco companies. Your
only prayer is being independent, appearing independent, and for that reason, we don't get directly involved
with organizing you guys."144 RJR actually obtained the itineraries of various members of Congress who
supported or were considering supporting proposed tax increases - particularly a cigarette excise tax { so
that industry-funded protesters could pursue them carrying placards with anti-tax slogans. The protests
appeared to be spontaneous, but in at least one instance the placards for a choreographed demonstration were
literally shipped by Federal Express directly from RJR headquarters in Winston-Salem, North Carolina.145
BUYING LEGITIMACY: A PATRON OF THE ARTS
One of the challenges facing the tobacco industry was to create a positive corporate image. As in all their
pursuits, the tobacco industry spared no expense. In New York, for instance, the tobacco industry became a
major patron of the arts. In other parts of the country tobacco companies sponsored NASCAR events (the
Winston Cup, for instance) and the Virginia Slims women's tennis tournaments. By its own estimate, Philip
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51Morris spends over $150 million a year on public relations eorts, including millions in charitable giving.146
These investments don't create as readily recognizable nancial returns as donations as to elected ocials,
or magazine advertising, but their purpose is every bit as calculated. Philip Morris actually spends more on
promoting public awareness of its charitable giving than it does on charitable giving itself.147
A PATRON OF THE SCIENCES
In the scientic eld, the tobacco industry has had two primary goals: to forge friendly relationships with
important institutions, and to produce plausible scientic studies which, if they could not demonstrate the
truth of the industry's positions, could at least muddy the waters of scientic certainty and create doubt in
the minds of jurors and the voting public. To achieve the rst goal, the tobacco industry followed the same
strategy it did in politics and in civil society: it gave away enormous amounts of money. It made grants
to prestigious institutions like Johns Hopkins Medical School and Harvard Medical School (one industry
insider noted that the importance of the Harvard grant \continues to be viewed by some as relating wholly
to the name of Harvard,"148). While the industry was largely unable to purchase endorsements of the
industry's scientic positions from these institutions, it often succeeded in purchasing passivity and inaction.
Just as generous campaign donations could persuade members of Congress not to make trouble, donations
to scientic and medical institutions could at least purchase neutrality. In recounting donations made to
UCLA Medical School, an internal industry document noted \The industry also funded a project at UCLA
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52Medical School, but only after the Medical School reassured the industry that nothing damaging to the
industry would be discovered."149
Perhaps the most cynical eorts by the industry were to associate itself with cancer research institutions.
Philip Morris, R.J. Reynolds, the American Tobacco Company, Liggett & Myers, Lorillard, and Rothmans
all contributed money to the Sloan-Kettering Institute for Cancer Research; Philip Morris alone contributed
over $200,000 before 1970.150 Amazingly, the tobacco companies reaped more than merely positive publicity,
winning the complicity of some of the nation's most respected doctors. One Philip Morris memo noted with
pleasure that Frank Horsfal, the director of Sloan-Kettering, had \publicly expressed his doubt that smoking
is implicated in carcinoma causation. Dr. Horsfal's opinion (coupled with his demonstrated liking for our
Marlboro cigarettes) has been benecial. As head of the nation's principal cancer research organization, he
has tremendous inuence."151 The contributions apparently helped to silence Ernst Wynder, a researcher
at the Institute. According to an internal industry document, Horsfal and other Sloan-Kettering ocials,
conscious of the interests of their patrons, began \subjecting Wynder to more rigorous screening procedures
before letting him speak in the name of the Institute. This has had a proper and pleasing eect... The [tax-]
deductible contribution to Sloan-Kettering is probably the most eective of all health research contribu-
tions."152 The irony of this statement is truly chilling; the contribution was \eective" because it prevented
the truth from coming to light.
Even the American Medical Association was wooed by the tobacco industry's largesse. In 1964 the six largest
tobacco companies oered the AMA $10 million dollars to fund research on smoking and health; two weeks
149Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, draft report, \Corporate Activity Project," B&W ID 681879254-715.
150David Kessler, \A Question of Intent: A Great American Battle With A Deadly Industry," PublicAairs, New York, 2001,
p.207
151C.H. Kibbee and J.C. Bowling, PM memo to Joseph F. Cullman III, \Sloan-Kettering Institute for Cancer Research, \18
February 1970, PM ID 2024774530.
152J.C. Bowling, PM memo to C.H. Kibbee, \Sloan-Kettering Contributions," November 23, 1964, PM ID 1005038364.
53after the AMA accepted the oer, Francis Blasingame, the AMA's executive vice-president, penned a letter
to the Federal Trade Commission in which he opined that \with respect to cigarettes, cautionary labeling
cannot be anticipated to serve the public interest with any degree of success."153 Ultimately, the companies
contributed $15.005 million between 1964 and 1972.154
DISCARDING EVIDENCE, FABRICATING DATA
To the general public, the tobacco industry presented itself as interested in scientic research, regardless
of where it might lead. In a full page advertisement which ran in 448 leading newspapers, beneath the
headline \A Frank Statement to Cigarette Smokers," one tobacco ad read: \We accept an interest in people's
health as a basic responsibility, paramount to every other consideration in our business. We always have
and always will cooperate closely with those whose task it is to safeguard the public health."155 The
advertisement announced an initiative to fund research into tobacco use and its health implications { an
eort that culminated in the creation of the Council for Tobacco Research. The research eort, however,
proved to be anything but altruistic.
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airs, New York, 2001,
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54THE COUNCIL FOR TOBACCO RESEARCH
The Tobacco Industry Research Committee, later renamed the Council for Tobacco Research (CTR), was
headed by a man of impeccable credentials. Clarence Cook Little was a Harvard-educated cancer researcher
and former university president who had been active at both the National Cancer Institute and the American
Cancer Society. His stature in the scientic community provided the essential element of credibility the
industry needed. Though CTR was a grant-making organization that claimed to be dedicated to the cause
of scientic health research, applications for grants from the CTR's Special Projects division were vetted
by tobacco industry lawyers rather than scientists. Their explicit purpose was to develop scientic data
that could be used to defend the tobacco companies in court.156 One internal memorandum from Philip
Morris noted, \[I]f CTR [the Center for Tobacco Research] is to be useful, ways must be found to bolster its
reputation so it can be useful to `launder' industry money."157 Another internal document was even more
frank:
[CTR] was set up as an industry shield.... CTR has helped our legal counsel by giving advice and technical
information, which was needed in court trials. CTR has provided spokesmen for the industry at Congressional
hearings... On these projects, CTR has acted as a front.158
At a 1979 meeting of American Tobacco ocials, tobacco industry ocials agreed that \CTR Special Projects
should continue under CTR to give investigators an aura of independence."159 That aura was a deception.
Wrote a Lorillard ocial, \CTR is NOT independent { because of what we have asked them not to do."160
156\Environmental Tobacco Smoke: The Brown and Williamson Documents," Journal of the Ameri-
can Medical Association, Special Communication, July 19, 1995, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/sci-
pubs/journals/archive/jama/vol 274/no 3/sc5045.htm
157Philip Morris notes, New York meeting, November 15, 1978.
158See Haines v. Liggett Group, 140 F.R.D. 681 (E.D.N.J. 1992)
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55Tobacco companies did more than tailor the direction of their research; they were so dominated by the threat
of litigation that they willfully avoided recognizing data that contradicted the industry's litigation positions.
In one memo, an ocial of Brown & Williamson suggested that certain kinds of information from British
American Tobacco (BAT), Brown & Williamson's parent company, were better left uncommunicated: \[I]f
the reports include discussions of pharmacological eects of nicotine, the information will not be interesting
and would be helpful to the plainti." The company ultimately decided to receive the reports, but remained
ready \to inform BAT to cease sending the data to B&W if the science is not interesting."161 \Interesting"
in this context is an industry euphemism meaning \favorable for our litigation defense strategy."
When such \uninteresting" research was produced, the industry was more than willing to destroy or suppress
it. Another memo, from RJR, makes this willingness explicit:
We do not foresee any diculty in the event a decision is reached to remove certain reports from Research
les. Once it becomes clear that such action is necessary for the successful defense of our present and future
suits, we will promptly remove all such reports from our les. As a rule, we invalidate about 15 reports
each year for various reasons... [W]e can cite misinterpretation of data as reason for invalidation.... As
an alternative to invalidation, we can have the authors rewrite those sections of the reports which appear
objectionable.162
What is clear from these documents is that the tobacco industry was intent not merely on averting its eyes
from potentially harmful discoveries, but on making scientic claims it knew to be untrue.
161J.K. Wells III, B&W memo to E. Pepples, \BAT Science," February 17, 1986, B&W ID 682419469-70
162M. Senkus, RJR memo to Max Crohn, \Invalidation of Some Reports in the Research Dept.," December 18, 1969, RJR ID
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56THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY'S SCIENTISTS: THE WHITECOAT
PROJECT
While they knew that giving to recognized institutions like Harvard and Sloan-Kettering would win the
industry praise (and perhaps even some breathing room), tobacco industry lawyers recognized that they
would need scientic evidence to support the industry's positions. To protect themselves from regulation
and litigation, the tobacco companies needed scientists who were willing to go on the record.
In 1967, Rosser Reeves, a public relations expert employed by the tobacco industry, proposed to enlist \janis-
saries" to challenge the conventional wisdom on smoking and health, with the knowledge that those people
would come to \depend on it for their livelihood and whose zeal, consequently, often runs well ahead of their
facts."163 In short, Reeves sought to create a class of advocates who could be expected to play fast and loose
with science, while maintaining plausible deniability for the industry.
The eort was code-named \The Whitecoat Project," after the white lab coats worn by scientists. The
project had four primary goals:
-
Resist and roll back smoking restrictions.
-
Restore smoker condence.
-
163Rosser Reeves, Tiderock Corp. memo to Anne Heteld et al., \The Study of a Propaganda Phenomenon," July 18, 1967,
PM ID 1003059283-85.
57Reverse scientic and popular misconception that ETS is harmful.
-
Restore social acceptability of smoking.164
Records of correspondences between industry ocials and Whitecoat Project scientists sometimes resemble
negotiations between businessmen, explicit in their recognition of a quid pro quo: A 1965 RJR memorandum
describes such an exchange:
Dr. Sprunt wants something more than the hope they will approve his grant application before he takes
further public position on our behalf... Dr. Sprunt's present attitude is that he is prepared to testify in
Washington (including an adequate statement by accepting our help in preparing the nal form...) but feels
that before he does so, we should adopt a more positive attitude towards his situation.165
While it is written in euphemisms, the meaning of the conversation is clear: Dr. Sprunt is willing to testify to
industry-friendly conclusions (\adequate statement"), even sign his name to a document drafted by industry
lawyers (\accepting our help in preparing the nal form") but only in exchange for more money that he has
previously been oered (\a more positive attitude toward his situation").
The American Medical Association and the American Public Health Association have had policies for years
urging researchers not to accept tobacco industry money, but nearly all universities have continued to allow
professors to accept such support, citing the importance of academic freedom.166 The tobacco industry
had its own reasons for funding research, which had little to do with academic freedom. In 1993, after the
Environmental Protection Agency ruled that environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) was a Class A carcinogen
165Edwin Jacob (of Cabell, Medinger, Forsyth & Decker), letter to H.H. Ramm (of R.J. Reynolds), January 25, 1965, RJR ID
500887112-13.
166Scott Shane, \Tobacco Deal Would Disband Controversial Research Center," Baltimore Sun, November 14, 1998
58and a health hazard, the tobacco industry paid thousands of dollars to scientists to voice their objection to
the nding in letters to medical and scientic journals.167 Dr. Gio Gori was one of thirteen scientists who
accepted large sums of money from the Tobacco Institute to write letters to the editor attacking the EPA's
report. Records show that Gori was paid $20,137 for two letters to the Wall Street Journal, one letter to
the British medical publication The Lancet, one letter to the NCI Journal, and one opinion piece for the
Wall Street Journal. Dr. Gori, a former scientist at the National Cancer Institute, is now a consultant to
the tobacco industry.168 Said Clive Bates, director of the antismoking organization Action on Smoking and
Health, \No matter how strict you are about conicts of interest, there is not much you can do if scientists
conceal who they are paid by."169
THE CENTER FOR INDOOR AIR RESEARCH
Concealing the existence of nancial relationships between scientists and industry gures became a critical
component of the tobacco industry's research strategy. As late as the 1980s, some industry groups were
maintaining their campaign through openly tobacco-aliated groups. While the results invariably favored
the industry's position, the subterfuge involved was so transparent that the studies lacked credibility. A
1987 Tobacco Institute memo lamented:
Yesterday morning, the Texas Association of Wholesale Distributors and the Tobacco Institute held a news
conference in Dallas to release the results of an environmental smoke study...The highly favorable results
of the study were reviewed at our meeting last week....Questioning at the conference was skeptical but not
167David Hanners, \Scientists Were Paid to Write Letters { Tobacco Industry Sought to Discredit EPA Report," Pioneer
Planet/St.Paul Press, August 4, 1998. See also Philip Morris Report, \IAQ Goals," January 25, 1993, Philip Morris ID
2023206195/6198.
168David Hanners, \Scientists Paid to Write on Tobacco: Letters Aimed to Discredit Report on Secondhand Smoke's Eects,"
Saint Paul Pioneer Press, August 14, 1998
169Clare Dyer, \Tobacco Company Set Up Network of Sympathetic Scientists," British Medical Journal, May 23, 1998
59hostile. The Institute's open sponsorship of the study aected the credibility of the results...170
Because industry allies lacked credibility, and most independent scientists (particularly in medicine) were
unwilling to associate themselves with such a disreputable industry, cigarette companies created a front
group called the Center for Indoor Air Research (CIAR). Formed in late 1987, and funded by a coalition
that included Lorillard, Philip Morris and R.J. Reynolds, the purpose and origins of the organization had to
be carefully concealed if it was to fulll its mission of legitimizing industry propaganda.171 As a result, many
of the documents about hiring sta and recruiting scientists for it were stamped \condential," and much
of the work to form CIAR was labeled \Attorney Work Product" by Covington & Burling, the Tobacco
Institute's legal counsel.
The minutes of a secret meeting in London makes the purpose of funding CIAR clear:
Philip Morris presented to the UK industry their global strategy on environmental tobacco smoke [ETS].
In every major international area (USA, Europe, Australia, Far East, South America, Central America
and Spain) they are proposing, in key countries, to set up a team of scientists organized by one national
coordinating scientist and American lawyers, to review scientic literature or carry out work on ETS to keep
the controversy alive.172
While tobacco industry executives were conscious of the deceptive nature of their enterprise, their chief
concern was how this might hinder their ability to recruit scientists:
The excessive involvement of external lawyers at this very basic scientic level is questionable and, in Europe
at least, is likely to frighten o a number of scientists who might otherwise be prepared to talk to the industry.
173
170Document available at http://www.pmdocs.com/getallimg.asp?DOCID=2025855771/5772
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60This concern was well-founded; the industry's sometimes manic eort to recruit scientists had already created
a number of embarrassing, awkward situations, as the Philip Morris memorandum below indicates.
MEMO174
To: J.P. Rupp, Attorney [A partner at Covington & Burling]
From: Helmut Gaisch [Philip Morris, Europe]
Date: November 16, 1987
Dear John,
I had a surprise phone call earlier today from Dr. Bieva in Brussels. He was rather amazed that a certain
Dr. Weimberg in Washington should call, asking him exactly the questions that we had already asked him
and also oering him a contract. It made him uneasy that so much attention was suddenly focussed upon
him from America (we had already introduced him to Shook Hardy).175 We really should not be seen falling
over each other when contacting independent scientists.
When I gave you the other day { in condence { our list of \whitecoats", it was precisely with the purpose in
mind of avoiding double approaches....May I suggest that we agree as quickly as possible amongst ourselves
on who contacts whom....
Kind regards,
Helmut
According to a memo from industry law rm Covington & Burling, which emerged during the discovery
phase of litigation in Minnesota, the company's consultants included \an editor" of the Lancet, an adviser to
a select committee of the British House of Commons, and members of working groups of the International
Agency for Research in Cancer.176
One of our consultants is an editor of this very inuential British medical journal, and is continuing to
publish numerous reviews, editorials, and comments on environmental tobacco smoke and other issues.177
174Document available at http://www.tobaccofreedom.org/issues/documents/landman/whitecoats/p1.gif
175Shook, Hardy & Bacon is a national law rm that represented both Philip Morris and R.J. Reynolds.
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177Id. The Philip Morris memo can be found at http://www.bmj.com/misc/philipmemo.shtml
61These scientists were \asked to cover all substantial scientic conferences where they can usefully inuence
scientic and public opinion," and were \not paid unless and until they actually perform work," according
to the Covington and Burling memo.178
Because deniability was a cornerstone of the industry eort, the CIAR's scientic recruits were carefully
picked to avoid any detectable evidence of bias:
The consultants should, ideally, according to Philip Morris, be European scientists who have had no previous
connection with tobacco companies and who have no previous record on the primary issue which might,
according to Remes,179 lead to problems of attribution.180
The memorandum, however, leaves little doubt that biased research was the explicit goal of the project:
Philip Morris then expect [sic] the group of scientists to operate within the connes of decisions taken by
PM scientists to determine the general direction of research, which apparently would then be 'ltered' by
lawyers to eliminate areas of sensitivity.181
CIAR acknowledged no connection with the tobacco industry.182 Its annual budget of about $5 million,
however, came almost exclusively from the four largest U.S. tobacco companies.183 Though they worked
assiduously to create the perception of independence, the nancial powers behind CIAR were not shy about
ensuring that the research the Center produced was favorable. The authors of a 1996 study on CIAR-funded
178Id.
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ecting indoor air quality; on factors governing human exposure to and retention of those constituents;
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ects of those constituents on health, including exposure-response relationships; and on methods of preventing or
abating indoor air contaminant concentrations. The research program is supplemented by periodic conference workshops and
commissioned monographs.\ This description is available on the web page of the Pacic Northwest Pollution Prevention Resource
Center, which itself appears to be an industry front, at http://www.pprc.org/pprc/rfp/archives/indoora.html
183Scott Shane, \Tobacco Deal Would Disband Controversial Research Center," Baltimore Sun, November 14, 1998
62projects found that \...one recipient of an applied project, Roger A. Jenkins (1995), of Oak Ridge National
Laboratory, testied at length regarding the funding process for his project. He stated that CIAR had
approached him with a proposal for his project, and that he and his colleagues had developed the study
methodology with input from CIAR, R.J. Reynolds, and Bellomy Research (a marketing research rm)."
CIAR tax records show that the Oak Ridge lab received $797,892 in 1993 for Jenkins to conduct a study
titled \Determination of Human Exposure to Environmental Tobacco Smoke."184
Another project related to ETS was conducted by ACVA Atlantic, a small rm that was paid $13,800 in 1985
to conduct a study of air quality in homes.185 Although the president of ACVA Atlantic, Gray Robertson,186
has since characterized his organization as \an independent consulting rm specializing in solving indoor air
problems such as sick building syndrome," his research proposal stated { before even preliminary tests were
conducted - that the results of his study could demonstrate that ETS has a relatively insignicant eect on
indoor air quality.187 In addition, the methodology for the study stated the following:
Twelve homes will be selected in three discrete areas of the country giving a total of 36 homes, the selection
will be by the Tobacco Institute who will provide the names, addresses, phone numbers and contact at each
of the homes chosen to [sic] ACVA.188
As the Journal of the American Medical Association later noted, \It is highly unusual for an `independent'
company to allow an organization such as the Tobacco Institute, which clearly has a strong interest in the
outcome of a study, to select the sites for the study." 189
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63Perhaps to avoid association with it previous work for the tobacco industry, ACVA Atlantic later changed
its name to Healthy Buildings International (HBI). In practice, however, it remained the same organization,
faithfully carrying out the same industry-supported agenda. A 1994 sta report prepared by the House Sub-
committee on Health and the Environment suggested that a study conducted by HBI to measure levels of
ETS in typical oce environments contained fabricated and falsied data.190 The HBI study, like the ACVA
Atlantic study before it, had been funded as a special project by the Center for Indoor Air Research, and
concluded that \with good ventilation, acceptable air quality can be maintained with moderate amounts of
smoking."191 HBI employees stated that their eld notes had been routinely altered so that the levels of ETS
reported were lower than those that had actually been measured.192 Alfred H. Lowrey, a research chemist
at the Naval Research Laboratory who reviewed the HBI data, concluded that \the data is so marred by
unsubstantiated data entries, discrepancies, and misclassications that it raises serious questions of scientic
fraud."193 Though the revelation of the falsied data brought HBI's usefulness to an end, the organization
had already served its purpose well. Between August, 1985, and September, 1994, employees of HBI/ACVA
Atlantic testied on at least 129 occasions before federal, state, or local government agencies concerning
ETS. HBI's standard statement was that, according to their analyses, moderate levels of smoking could
be tolerated indoors with adequate ventilation. In many cases, they did not acknowledge tobacco industry
funding.194
One of the main goals of CIAR was to \mainstream" industry-friendly research, to create the (false) im-
190House Subcommittee on Health and the Environment. Oversight Hearing on Tobacco Product Regulation. Washington,
DC: Committee on Energy and Commerce, US House of Representatives; 1994. House Subcommittee on Health and the
Environment. Environmental Tobacco Smoke Investigation: Exhibits. Washington, DC: Subcommittee on Health and the
Environment, Committee on Energy and Commerce, US House of Representatives; 1994.
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With, Researchers Say," USA Today, November 2, 1994
64pression that scientic opinion was divided on issues surrounding Environmental Tobacco Smoke. In this,
they were largely successful. Publications of the Center for Indoor Air Research are to this day included
alongside legitimate scientic publications, in the University of Washington library, for instance, and at many
other sites.195 As late as 1998, the CIAR was still oering fellowships through the website of The American
Thoracic Society - the medical section of the American Lung Association.196
USING THIRD-PARTY FRONT GROUPS
Just as the tobacco industry learned in the 1970s to conceal the source of its scientic claims, it also learned
to mask its eorts in the political and commercial realms. Because tobacco money has attracted negative
attention from the press, tobacco interests often use front groups with benign-sounding names, a tactic that
enables corporations to take part in public debates and government hearings behind a cover of community
concern or scientic independence.197 Merrill Rose, executive vice president of the public relations rm
Porter/Novelli, advises her clients: \Put your words in someone else's mouth... There will be times when
the position you advocate, no matter how well framed and supported, will not be accepted by the public
simply because you are who you are. Any institution with a vested commercial interest in the outcome of
an issue has a natural credibility barrier to overcome with the public, and often, with the media."198
The tobacco industry has taken Rose's words to heart. Said a Philip Morris ocial at a 1984 workshop on
cultivating relationships with third-party organizations,
The whole question of getting third-party assistance and enlisting this whole third-party concept in our
defense structure is to give us clout, to give us power, to give us credibility, to give us leverage, to give us
access where we don't ordinarily have access ourselves. Those are the kinds of things we are looking for.
195For example, the University of Washington's library shows CIAR publications alongside legitimate scientic works. See
http://sta.washington.edu/ehlib/outlinks/bibls/iaqbibl.html
196A copy of the fellowship o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65And to make them useful, we have to cultivate them, we have to build them, we have to stay with them...
what we're doing is nothing new because the company has been doing this all along. Every time we have an
issue, we always reach out to third parties wherever we can.199
In 1994, as part of the coordinated campaign against the FDA, Philip Morris strategists proposed to their
board of directors a series of \Allied attacks, where friendly third parties are engaged on our side but
without direct or obvious connection to the industry."200 In one report, Philip Morris identied twenty-ve
third-party ally organizations:
Action Institute for the Study of Religion and Liberty
Alexis DeToqueville Institution
Americans for Tax Reform
Cato Institute
Center for the Study of American Business
Citizens for a Sound Economy
Citizens for Tax Justice/Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy
Claremont Institute for the Study of Statesmanship and Political Philosophy
Consumer Alert
Grocery Manufacturers of America
Heartland Institute
Heritage Foundation
Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace
Institute for Research on the Economics of Taxation
Mackinac Center for Public Policy
Manhattan Institute
National Association of Manufacturers
National Center for Policy Analysis
National Empowerment Television
National Journalism Center
National Policy Forum
Pacic Research Institute for Public Policy
Tax Foundation
Texas Republic
Washington Legal Foundation201
199Workshop: Dealing with the Issues Indirectly: Constituencies, Philip Morris 1984 Corporate Aairs World Conference,
September 13, 1984, Philip Morris ID 2025421934/2000
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66Some of the above organizations are simply ideological peers of the tobacco industry, dedicated to unregulated
markets, but otherwise generally independent. In many other cases, however, these third-party groups took
their marching orders directly from the tobacco industry. One internal Philip Morris memo suggested of the
Washington Legal Foundation, \have them publish an article."[emphasis added]202 When a Philip Morris
executive learned that Roll Call, the Capitol Hill newspaper, was running a special issue on the Food and
Drug Administration, he dashed o an e-mail that ordered \Contact CSE [Citizens for a Sound Economy]
about running an ad."203
The tobacco industry was a major contributor to most, if not all, of the listed groups, including the American
Enterprise Institute, the Cato Institute, the Competitive Enterprise Institute, Citizens for a Sound Economy,
the Heritage Foundation, and the Washington Legal Foundation.204 These \thinktanks" and public policy
organizations serve multiple purposes for the industries that support them. They provide an illusion of
independence and scholarship, and they provide a resource for cultivating industry-friendly \experts."205
They also serve as a clearinghouse for data; in the words of lobbyist Tommy Boggs, \information... became
something that special interests learned they could develop quicker, better, faster, and more accurately than
the government could."206
202Craig L. Fuller, PM memo to Michael A. Miles, \February Monthly Report," March 17, 1994, PM ID 2023439346-51.
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67The relationship between the tobacco industry and the Cato Institute is typical. The Cato Institute, one of
the most frequently quoted policy institutions in Washington, has received hundreds of thousands of dollars
of support from Philip Morris and R.J. Reynolds. In return, Cato has produced industry friendly reports,
conferences, and articles. One policy forum was entitled, \The New Prohibition? Freedom & Tobacco Under
Siege by the FDA."207 Cato published an article in Regulation, its quarterly journal, entitled \Lies, Damned
Lies, & 400,000 Smoking-Related Deaths," which challenged the validity of data from the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC). If the same study had been written by the Tobacco Institute, it would have
been immediately dismissed by serious journalists (particularly if it had borne the same title). But because
Cato's status as a \legitimate" conservative thinktank is secure, its contentions were not viewed with the
same skepticism. As a result, the article provoked positive commentary that appeared in newspapers around
the country, including in The Boston Globe.208
ATTACKING INDUSTRY'S OPPONENTS
Most industry players remain unwilling to attack the FDA in public, either for fear of retaliation or, more
likely, for fear that openly attacking an agency charged with protecting health and safety could create
a political backlash. As a result, one of the most important roles of the tobacco industry's third-party
front groups was to engage in the hand-to-hand combat of the public relations business { a role that large
companies are constrained from playing themselves. The public relations rm Hill & Knowlton outlined a
strategy for dealing with the tobacco industry's scientic critics:
207Public Citizen Congress Watch, \A Million for Your Thoughts: The Industry-funded Campaign Against the FDA by
Conservative Think Tanks," pp. 29-32 Washington, D.C., 1996
208See e.g. Je Jacoby, \Big Lies About Tobacco," The Boston Globe, May 10, 1999
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smearing and belittling them;
-
trying to overwhelm them with mass publication of the opposed viewpoints of other specialties;
-
debating them in the public arena; or
-
we can determine to raise the issue far above them, so they are hardly even mentioned; and then we can make our real case.209
Examples of \smearing and belittling" by third-party groups abound. The Washington Legal Foundation,
which received generous support from the tobacco industry, and appeared in Philip Morris' list of third party
allies (see pp.67-68), produced advertisements that showed two gravestones accompanied by the headline \If
a Murderer Kills You, It's Homicide. If a Drunk Driver Kills You, It's Manslaughter. If the FDA Kills
You, It's Just Being Cautious."210 These advertisements ran in The New York Times, USA Today, The
Wall Street Journal, The National Journal, and Roll Call.211 Citizens for a Sound Economy (which also
appears on Philip Morris' list of allies) sponsored ads that claimed, \A better quality of life{even life itself{is
being denied to too many Americans because of the FDA's misplaced priorities."212 The group received
about $250,000 a year in the early 1990s from Philip Morris to help launch its state aliates in New Jersey,
New York and four other states.213 CSE spent some $2 million on anti-F.D.A. advertising, organizing and
lobbying between 1995 and 1996.214
210Robert Dreyfuss, \Tobacco Enemy Number One," Mother Jones, 1997
211William Castagnoli, \What is the WLF and Why is it Challenging the FDA?" Med. Marketing & Media, April, 1995
212Robert Dreyfuss, \Tobacco Enemy Number One," Mother Jones, 1997
213Peter H. Stone, \Blowing Smoke at its Critics," National Journal, April 20, 1996
214\A Million For Your Thoughts: The Industry-Funded Campaign Against the FDA by Conservative Think Tanks," Public
Citizen, July 24, 1996
69Like industry allies in Congress, third-party allies of the tobacco industry showed a willingness to engage
the FDA's leadership on a personal level. The National Legal and Policy Center, for instance, made more
than 850 FOIA requests in an attempt to nd damaging information about David Kessler. It found $850
worth of taxi cab receipts over a six-year period, which industry allies in Congress seized upon in an eort
to impugn Kessler's integrity and divert attention from the tobacco debate.215
CONTROLLING MASS MEDIA
One of the most important components of the tobacco industry's \outside game" has been attention to the
mass media. Just as the industry has leveraged its nancial resources to forge relationships with political
leaders, scientists and social organizations, so it has used its vast resources to win inuence in the mass
media. Sometimes this inuence is used to quell a specic crisis. In order to defuse potential criticism
over the marketing of tobacco products to minority neighborhoods, the tobacco industry provided direct
nancial support to the National Association of Hispanic Publishers, the National Newspaper Publishers
Association, California Hispanic Publishers, West Coast Black Publishers, and the National Federation of
Hispanic-Owned Newspapers.216 In 1993, the West Coast Black Publishers Association actually passed a
resolution endorsing the right of the tobacco industry to market to the black community, and penned a letter
to Senator Ted Kennedy (D-MA) explaining their support for the industry.217
The increasing consolidation of media corporations has helped to facilitate the forging of alliances between
industry and media. In an internal memo from 1985, former Philip Morris chief executive Hamish Maxwell
outlined a strategy to shape public opinion in the company's favor by directly inuencing the content of the
215David Kessler, \A Question of Intent: A Great American Battle With A Deadly Industry," PublicAairs, New York, 2001,
p.344. See also \Kessler Travel Investigation Called A Smear," USA Today, February 21, 1996, p.1D
216Id. at 206
217Id. at 211
70television and print media:
The sixth point I want to make is that we are not using our considerable clout with the media. A number
of media proprietors that I have spoken to are sympathetic to our position { Rupert Murdoch and Malcom
Forbes are two good examples. The media likes the money they make from our advertisements and they are
an ally that we can and should exploit.218
An appendix to the memo, written by another Philip Morris employee, notes approvingly
As regards the media, we plan to build similar relationships to those we now have with Murdoch's News
Limited with other newspaper proprietors. Murdoch's papers rarely publish anti-smoking articles these
days.219
This concern with directly inuencing media was still alive and well in 1990, by which point the project had
been dubbed \Operation Rainmaker." As the memo below makes clear, Philip Morris had become convinced
that merely inuencing the media would be insucient for its purposes, and had concluded that purchasing
major media conglomerates oered the potential for reliably disseminating industry propaganda.
TOP SECRET: Philip Morris { Operation Rainmaker
TOP SECRET Internal Report
Date: March 20, 1990
What are we trying to accomplish? Prevent further deterioration of overall social, legislative and regulatory
climate, and ultimately, actually improve the climate for the marketing and use of tobacco products.220
218\The Perspective of PM International on Smoking and Health Issues: Text of the discussion docu-
ment used at the meeting of top management," Internal Memorandum, Philip Morris, 1985, available at
http://www.media-awareness.ca/eng/news/news/two/rupsmoke.htm
219Internal Memorandum, Philip Morris, 1985, available at http://www.media-awareness.ca/eng/news/news/two/rupsmoke.htm
220\Operation Rainmaker," Internal Memorandum, Philip Morris, March 20, 1990,
http://www.tobaccofreedom.org/issues/documents/landman/rainmaker/p1.gif
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... ACQUISITION - if we are to truly inuence the public policy agenda and the information ow to the
populace we must be the media, we must be part of it. The only way to do this is to own a major media
outlet. If we are not willing to take this step, then we are not serious about really wanting to change the
atmosphere.
Organizations that should be very seriously considered include:
- Knight Ridder
- Zuckerman's group
- the Copley News Service
- United Press International
- or a major city daily that has access to { and from { all of the major wire services.221
The signicance of the last portion of the memo { \that has access to { and from { all of the major wire
services" { should not be overlooked. A media organization with access to the major wire services could
arrange that its stories be picked up by the thousands of smaller local papers around the country, a unique
vantage point from which to legitimize and disseminate the industry's point of view. Philip Morris seriously
considered proposals to buy UPI,222 but ultimately declined; the extent to which the plans outlined in the
\Operation Rainmaker" memorandum were ever put into eect is unclear. But it is apparent that the
tobacco industry has made signicant inroads into major media organizations, among them those of Rupert
221Id.
222David Kessler, \A Question of Intent: A Great American Battle With A Deadly Industry," PublicAairs, New York, 2001,
p.211. UPI was purchased in May, 2000 by New World Communications, Inc., the publisher of The Washington Times, the
arch-conservative newspaper aliated with the Rev. Sun Myung Moon's Unication Church. The transfer of ownership sparked
the resignation of veteran White House correspondent Helen Thomas and International editor Lee Michael Katz. See The New
York Times, May 16, 2000.
72Murdoch and Malcom Forbes, mentioned in Hamish Maxwell's 1985 memorandum.
FOX/NEWS CORP.
Some of the most obvious connections between Rupert Murdoch's media conglomerate and the tobacco
industry are at the very top of the corporate structure. Philip Morris CEO Georey Bible joined News
Corp.'s Board of Directors on June 23, 1998; News Corp. owns the Fox Network. Bible eectively replaced
Hamish Maxwell, the former chief executive of Philip Morris, who served on the News Corp. Board of
Directors until early in 1998. Rupert Murdoch, CEO of News Corp., has sat on Philip Morris' corporate
board since 1989. As a result, each is intimately familiar with the business of the other, and the two have
oered one another public support. Murdoch himself has defended the tobacco industry in public; he told
240 executives attending the Forbes CEO Forum that Philip Morris and the tobacco industry in general
were \victims of a classic media feeding frenzy."223
The Fox News Channel shows a pronounced conservative bias in its stang (anchorman Tony Snow is a
former aide to Vice President Dan Quayle), and is also known for being particularly heavy-handed in its top-
down control of content. \I've been at editorial meetings," said one Fox News Channel employee. \Certain
stories y and certain stories don't. I'm not blind and neither are my colleagues. Everyone is aware that
something is at work. There's a reason that there's a perception that Fox leans to the right."224
One of those reasons is Roger Ailes, the Chairman and Chief Executive Ocer of the Fox News Channel.225
Ailes is the former executive producer of the right-wing \Rush Limbaugh Show."226 Ailes also has tobacco
connections of his own. An internal R.J. Reynolds memo from 1988 details how Ailes was the media director
223Jerey Klein, \Where There's Smoke," Mother Jones, September/October, 1998
224Daphne Eviatar, \Murdoch's Fox News," The Nation, March 12, 2001
225See http://www.newscorp.com/management/foxnews.html
226Limbaugh, a proud cigar smoker, is also an outspoken defender of tobacco products. It has not been proven that nicotine
is addictive, the same with cigarettes causing emphysema [and other diseases]." See The Rush Limbaugh Show, April 24, 1994,
as cited by EXTRA!, http://www.fair.org/press-releases/limbaugh-debates-reality.html#nicotine-addictiveness
73for the California Tax Initiative Campaign, an eort by tobacco companies \organized and directed to deal
with Proposition 99."227 The memo notes that \Roger Ailes, a nationally recognized candidate and issue
media professional, has replaced Hal Larsen as media director," and notes condently that \in addition to
working with the tobacco industry, Ailes is director of Bush for President media operations." 228
Ailes' Fox News exhibits more than a generalized conservative bent; it is sometimes stridently anti-regulatory.
The Fox News website, www.foxnews.com, is lled with attacks on the EPA229 and FDA,230 many written
by Steven Milloy, a Cato Institute \scholar" with ties to the tobacco industry's public relations arm (see pp.
109-114). Milloy refers to FDA warnings as \yet another example of a government agency terrorizing the
public... for political gain." Fox News applies a similar skepticism to anti-smoking activism: the channel
recently declined to air an anti-smoking advertisement produced by the American Legacy Foundation. The
advertisement, \Body Bag," depicts corpses wrapped in body bags being pulled from a truck in front of
Philip Morris headquarters. Fox ocials said the decision not to air the ad was based on content, not board
relationships.231 But from the network which popularized such programs as \When Animals Attack" and
\World's Greatest Police Chases, " the explanation seems incomplete.
FORBES: CAPITALIST TOOL
In 1994, Philip Morris began a nationwide counterattack on second-hand smoke, purchasing full-page ad-
vertisements in forty newspapers, including the New York Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times,
227Proposition 99 was an antismoking ballot initiative passed in 1988 by the voters of California.
228Memorandum from Roger Mozingo to Dolph W. von Arx, W.G. Champion Mitchell, and Gene Ainsworth dated July 7,
1988, re California Tobacco Initiative meeting July 6, 1988, Tobacco Institute Board Room, Washington, D.C. Copy available
at http://www.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/calminnesota/html/3425/001/
229\Adjusting Science to Fit Policy," available at http://foxnews.com/views/junkscience/030201.sml
230\FDA's Mercurial Fish Story," available at http://foxnews.com/views/junkscience/010119.sml
231Wendy Melillo, \Fox, CBS Nix 'Morbid' Anti-smoking Ads," Ad Week, February 14, 2000
74Chicago Tribune, Miami Herald, Boston Globe, and Baltimore Sun. The ads consisted of an article reprinted
from Forbes MediaCritic that questioned the notion that second-hand smoke causes cancer in non-smokers,
and appeared under the headline, \If We Said It, You Might Not Believe It."232
You probably shouldn't believe it anyway. The Forbes article was written by Jacob Sullum, then managing
editor of Reason magazine, who called the Environmental Protection Agency's 1993 report on second-hand
smoke \one-sided, credulous and supercial," and argued that journalists \missed an important story about
the corruption of science by the political crusade against smoking."233 What neither the original article nor
the advertisements mentioned was that Sullum himself received tobacco industry funding, that Reason mag-
azine received tobacco funding, or that Sullum's key sources for the article, Gary Huber of the University of
Texas Health Science Center234 and Alvin Feinstein, described as \an epidemiologist at Yale University,"235
also received tobacco industry support.
Sullum wasn't the only voice at Forbes to come to the defense of the tobacco industry. Forbes editor Peter
Brimelow, a former staer of Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT), actually wrote an article citing the supposed
health benets of smoking. In another, Brimelow attacked David Kessler in starkly personal terms, calling
him \the quintessential D.C. chameleon... with an intense desire to control,"236 describing his career path as
one that would be \snied at by doctors concerned with professional standards,"237 and characterizing his
willingness to stay on under President Clinton as \a stunning act of treachery."238 The cover of that issue
232Sheldon Rampton and John Stauber, \Tobacco's Second-hand Science of Smoke-Filled Rooms," PR Watch, Volume 7, No.
3, Third Quarter, 2000
233Jim Naureckas, \Smoke Screens," Extra!, September/October 1994
234Huber's research on secondhand smoke at Harvard was funded in part by a grant \from the major tobacco cigarette manufac-
turers in the United States." He left the University of Kentucky's Tobacco and Health Research Institute after evidence surfaced
of further payments from R.J. Reynolds, Brown and Williamson, and the Tobacco Institute. Over the years, Huber received more
than $7 million in tobacco industry research funding. For Huber's own perspective, see Frontline, \Inside the Tobacco Deal: In-
terviews, Gary Huber, 1998, available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/settlement/interviews/huber.html.
235Between 1985 and 1990, according to condential documents that leaked from Brown and Williamson, Feinstein received at
least $700,000 for basic epidemiological research from the special projects fund of the industry's Center for Tobacco Research.
See Jim Naureckas, \Smoke Screens," Extra!, September/October 1994
236Peter Brimelow and Leslie Spencer, \Just Call Me `Doc,"' Forbes, November 22, 1993, pp. 108-110
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75of Forbes caricatured Kessler dressed as Napoleon Bonaparte.239
Speaking at a conference sponsored by the Pacic Research Institute for Public Policy, a pro-business
501(c)(3) organization dedicated to \principles of individual freedom and personal responsibility" (which
also appears on Philip Morris' secret list of allied third-party organizations, see p.68), Brimelow spoke in
terms more betting a political consultant than a journalist: \What we need in science policy is countervail-
ing stereotypes to hand to the troops so they know which way to re." Said Brimelow, \The FDA is slowing
arrival of new drugs on the market and people are dying. It's a simple stereotype now being accepted, largely
because of the AIDS crisis... The question of cost is another stereotype. You can express a stereotype in one
sentence. It's commission or omission. They are not letting the drugs through."240
TOBACCO CONCLUSION
It is dicult to read a recounting of the misdeeds of the tobacco industry { the deception, the manipulation,
the perversion of science and of the democratic process { without experiencing frustration, even anger. And
it is surely a natural response to seek individuals to hold accountable; indeed, many have condemned the
industry itself. While this is an understandable response, it is woefully, even dangerously incomplete. In
fact, it may well be the conclusion that many of the performers in the tobacco industry drama would prefer,
because such a conclusion has a clinical neatness to it, and compartmentalizes the infection to the tobacco
industry alone. To conclude that the individuals who led the tobacco industry are simply depraved is to
risk obscuring the institutional structures that enabled, and perhaps even determined the tobacco industry's
239See Forbes, November 22, 1993
240\Junk Science: A Hazard to Your Health," Conference of the Pacic Research Institute for Public Policy, June 25-28, 1998.
Summary available at http://www.pacicresearch.org/events/jscience.html
76actions.
As the following section of this paper aims to demonstrate, the tobacco industry's behavior is not primarily
the fault of any exceptional failure of corporate morality, because the tobacco industry's moral compass is
not exceptional. When confronted with a similar situation, working with similar constraints { and similar
choices - Procter & Gamble followed the tobacco industry's battle-tested game plan precisely. While a similar
demonstration could be made with virtually any other industry that faces FDA regulation, for purposes of
simplicity the following section focuses on the FDA's consideration of the food additive olestra.
A CASE STUDY: PROCTER & GAMBLE AND OLESTRA
Not every industry player is as destructive as the tobacco industry; the tobacco industry is relatively rare
among legal industries in that its products are both addictive and lethal. But the strategies that the
tobacco industry pioneered have an enduring usefulness beyond the campaign to evade tobacco regulation;
the range of techniques employed by the tobacco industry and their legal and public relations arms can be
neatly adapted to other campaigns to manipulate the regulatory process. Procter & Gamble's campaign to
promote the approval and sale of olestra, its controversial \non-fat fat," serves to illustrate this larger point.
What emerges from a thorough comparison of the campaign to oppose the FDA's tobacco rules and the
campaign to secure the FDA's approval of olestra is that the proper locus of debate is not one which
anthropomorphizes the corporate form, and which denes misbehavior as a sign of personal deviancy, but
one which assesses systemic pressures and seeks systemic remedies. Whatever one thinks of the tobacco
industry, there is little reason to believe that Procter & Gamble is a \rogue corporation;" in fact, there is
every reason to believe it is not (for example, P&G has been hailed as a good corporate citizen in its home
state of Ohio, where it has stood behind politically risky tax hikes to support education).241 Yet Procter &
241See, e.g., Randy Ludlow, \Voinovich, P&G Lead School Tax Fight," The Cincinnati Post, February 17, 1998
77Gamble's tactics are startlingly reminiscent of the tobacco industry's.
Just as it is beyond the scope of this paper to opine upon the legal and scientic legitimacy of the FDA's
claim of authority over tobacco, it is beyond the scope of this paper to debate the scientic merits of the
FDA's approval of olestra; limitations of space and technical expertise demand this concession. The goal
of this section is not to show that the approval of olestra was a mistake, but to show that the approval
did not occur in a vacuum { that the activities of olestra's sponsor had the clear potential to inuence the
FDA's decision in ways that threaten the integrity of the process. Regardless of whether olestra is actually
dangerous, one can fairly conclude that factors irrelevant to the scientic merits play a signicant role in the
approval process, and in matters of health and safety, and this is cause for concern.
OLESTRA: WHAT IT COST PROCTER & GAMBLE
Procter & Gamble, a multinational company with some $35 billion in annual sales, spent nearly 25 years
and more than $200 million developing olestra, a chemical which tastes and cooks like fat but passes through
the body undigested.242 In addition to the research and testing, Procter & Gamble made signicant capital
investments; P&G constructed, with the help of equity partner Frito Lay, a $200 million olestra-making
plant in Cincinnati.243 In addition to the sunk nancial costs, by the mid-1990s olestra had become a kind
of test of corporate will. As P&G nally began marketing the product, P&G Chairman and Chief Executive
Ocer John Pepper said proudly, \This is one of a handful of events... that they will look back to and help
dene what this company is at its best. It's been torturous and at moments a source of some anxiety, but
242Art Levine, \Food Fight in Indianapolis," U.S. News, May 5, 1997
243Je Harrington, \Olestra Snacks Ready for Market," The Cincinnati Enquirer, February 10, 1998
78our people have stayed with it."244 It was also the dening event of Pepper's tenure as CEO. For all of these
reasons, Procter & Gamble was deeply committed to securing olestra's approval.
Procter & Gamble had an enormous nancial incentive to secure { and retain - FDA approval for their
product. The market for a non-fat fat is potentially enormous; Americans spend close to $2.4 billion on
diet-related foods each year, and $15 billion annually on snack foods.245 Given the rising rates of obesity
among Americans, and the increased emphasis on diet, olestra has the potential to be a dynamic revenue
generator. Financial analysts at Drexel Burnham Lambert predicted that olestra could generate $1.5 billion
annually in sales { which would make it the most protable product in Procter & Gamble's impressive
corporate history.246
In June of 1995, a House subcommittee held hearings that focused on the FDA's long delays in completing
its reviews of food-additive petitions. Many of the industry witnesses who appeared before the subcommittee
used olestra as an example of a benecial food additive that was languishing on the desks of FDA reviewers.
Members of Congress voiced their agreement. Under attack from all sides, FDA got the message.
CONCERNS ABOUT OLESTRA
In October of 1995, an FDA advisory committee of 22 scientists met to review the application and determine
their recommendation. Two issues dominated their discussion: the risk of so-called \fecal urgency," and the
danger that olestra would \wash out" benecial nutrients from a consumer's body.
In 1995 FDA medical ocer Karl Klontz reviewed a P&G study entitled \Measurement of Selected Fecal
Parameters in Subjects Consuming Increasing Levels of Olestra."247 For seven days, fteen volunteers who
244Id.
245Art Levine, \Food Fight in Indianapolis," U.S. News, May 5, 1997
246Ken Silverstein, \Procter & Gamble's Academic `White Hats,"' Multinational Monitor, November, 1997, Volume 18, Num-
ber 11
247Michael Jacobson and Leila Corcoran, \Snack Attack: Olestra," The Center for Science in the Public Interest, March, 1998
79had previously reacted to the fake fat were fed meals with zero, ten, or twenty grams a day of hidden olestra.
\There was a steady increase in the number of subjects who reported diarrhea with increasing dose of olestra
consumed," Klontz reported. The same was true of \severe" diarrhea as well as \loose stools." The study
showed that severe diarrhea only showed up when the volunteers ate olestra.248 In another P&G study
from 1993 - the most complete available on olestra and gastrointestinal symptoms { fully one-third of the
volunteers reported suering diarrhea at least once when they ate twenty grams of olestra a day. Only one
out of seventeen people who ate no olestra reported diarrhea.249 Except in extreme cases { for seriously
ill people or young children { diarrhea is not a serious health risk. But it could be commercially lethal for
a consumer product. Procter & Gamble was terried that negative publicity about this side eect could
threaten its investment.
The more serious medical concern was the risk of \washing out" nutrients { particularly carotenoids like
lycopene.250 In two 1993 P&G studies, thirty-nine people who ate eight grams a day of olestra (the equivalent
of sixteen chips { about one serving size) with meals for eight weeks had a fty percent drop in their
total blood carotenoids.251 Much of the debate within the Advisory Committee centered on the questions
surrounding carotenoids themselves. Some argued that carotenoids play a crucial health role. \There are
dozens of studies indicating that carotenoids protect against cancer, heart disease, and macular degeneration,
248\Final Report: Assessment of the Dose-Response Eect of Olestra on the Status of Fat-Soluble Vitamins and Other Marker
Nutrients in Humans," submitted by P&G to the FDA on January 29, 1993. See also \An Eight-Week Vitamin Restoration
Study in Humans Consuming Olestra," submitted by P&G to the FDA on June 2, 1993.
249Michael Jacobson and Leila Corcoran, \Snack Attack: Olestra," The Center for Science in the Public Interest, March, 1998
250In human beings, carotenoids can serve several important functions. The most widely studied and
well-understood nutritional role for carotenoids is their provitamin A activity. Deciency of vitamin A is a
major cause of premature death in developing nations, particularly among children. Vitamin A, which
has many vital systemic functions in humans, can be produced within the body from certain carotenoids, notably beta-carotene.
Carotenoids also play an important potential role in human health by acting as biological antioxidants, protecting cells and
tissues from the damaging eects of free radicals and singlet oxygen. Lycopene, the hydrocarbon carotenoid that gives tomatoes
their red color, is particularly eective at quenching the destructive potential of singlet oxygen. See Britton, G. (1995). Structure
and properties of carotenoids in relation to function. FASEB J., 9:1551-1558; Di Mascio, P., Kaiser, S., and Sies, H. (1989)
Lycopene as the most ecient biological carotenoid singlet oxygen quencher. Arch. Biochem. Biophys., 274:532-538.
251\Final Report: Assessment of the Dose-Response Eect of Olestra on the Status of Fat-Soluble Vitamins and Other Marker
Nutrients in Humans," submitted by P&G to the FDA on January 29, 1993. See also \An Eight-Week Vitamin Restoration
Study in Humans Consuming Olestra," submitted by P&G to the FDA on June 2, 1993.
80the most common form of blindness that strikes the elderly," said Walter Willett, head of the nutrition
department at the Harvard School of Public Health.252 The United States' own Dietary Guidelines for
Americans cite carotenoids \potentially benecial role in reducing the risk for cancer and certain other
chronic diseases."253 Others, including Procter & Gamble, contended that evidence was inconclusive.
THE FDA'S DECISION
Despite a heated debate, the FDA's Food Advisory Committee recommended approval after just four days of
meetings in November 1995. Ultimately, seventeen members of the committee endorsed olestra for approval
and ve opposed it.
The panel didn't include a single expert on carotenoids. The Center for Science in the Public Interest,
a watchdog group, contended that \At least nine of the seventeen `yea' votes came from food industry
consultants," and concluded that the panel had been \stacked in favor of P&G."254 This may give P&G too
much credit; there is no publicly available evidence that Procter & Gamble inuenced the composition of
the Advisory Committee. Given the relationship between scientic experts and industry, it may no longer
be possible to assemble a group of academic nutrition experts that are both qualied to assess the scientic
merits of a product like olestra and have never consulted for the food industry. Even if P&G played no role
in their selection, however, the dual role clearly implicates conict of interest concerns. Despite criticism of
the panel's composition, the FDA said it would try to issue a decision within two months.
252\Snack Attack: Olestra," Michael Jacobson and Leila Corcoran, The Center for Science in the Public Interest, March, 1998
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81In the intervening period, a number of distinguished scientists lobbied the FDA to deny olestra's petition
for approval. One week before the FDA made its determination, Walter Willett, head of the department of
nutrition at the Harvard School of Public Health, and Harvard colleague Meir Stampfer wrote a letter to
then-FDA commissioner David Kessler cautioning him that olestra's widespread use in snack foods could
cause hundreds of cases of blindness and thousands of deaths each year from heart disease and prostate and
lung cancer. \Avoid submitting the U.S. population, including children and pregnant women, to a massive
uncontrolled experiment with potentially disastrous consequences," they asked.255
Despite the outcry from many scientists, in January 24, 1996, the FDA approved olestra for use in savory
snacks such as chips, crackers, and tortilla chips. There were conditions: though olestra had been determined
to be safe, all snacks containing olestra would have to carry a label that stated:
This Product Contains Olestra. Olestra may cause abdominal cramping and loose stools. Olestra inhibits
the absorption of some vitamins and other nutrients. Vitamins A, D, E, and K have been added.
A second condition of FDA approval was a requirement that Procter & Gamble, which makes the fat, and
Frito-Lay, which manufacturers and sells the chips, report on any adverse health eects.256
BEHIND THE SCENES
The FDA's decision to approve olestra did not end the debate. Shortly after its approval, Henry Blackburn
of the University of Minnesota School of Public Health, one of the ve FDA panel members who voted
against olestra's approval, wrote a scathing criticism of the approval process in the prestigious New England
Journal of Medicine. \The FDA did not conduct a disinterested peer review," he charged. \The FDA sta
worked closely with P&G and acted as proponents of the company's petition."257 At another point he wrote,
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82\The olestra meetings carried the sense of a fait accompli, or at least a juggernaut moving inevitably toward
FDA approval," he wrote.258 Blackburn concluded that by the time of the meeting, \FDA sta members
had already concluded that olestra was safe and were acting as proponents of the petition for approval."259
He complained bitterly about both the lack of available scientic research, noting that \there is almost no
relevant scientic literature on [olestra's] potential health eects, except for studies by Procter & Gamble."260
Blackburn also echoed CSPI's concern that the panel was disproportionately composed of industry-friendly
scientists. Blackburn alleged that the committee that reviewed olestra \was weighed heavily with en-
trepreneurs, animal scientists, clinical scientists, and there was little representation of people with public
health and consumer interest."261 Of the seventeen FDA panelists voted to approve olestra, nine had links
to companies that could benet from its approval, including Bruce Chassy of the University of Illinois, whose
department's research has been funded by Nestl e and Dean Foods; John Doull of the University of Kansas
Medical Center, who has worked for Pillsbury and Best Foods; and David Lineback, a consultant whose
client list has included P&G.262
Blackburn and Willett were not alone in their concern. Dr. John Bertram of the Cancer Research Center
of Hawaii called olestra \a public health time bomb," while Dr. Herbert Needleman of the University of
Pittsburgh Medical School said \it would be clear folly to introduce this product into the diet of children."263
\Olestra has the potential to do signicant harm," said Ernst Schaefer of the Jean Mayer U.S. Department
of Agriculture Human Nutrition Research Center on Aging at Tufts University in Boston.264 \I don't think
the adverse health eects of olestra were given a reasonable public hearing, said Ian Greaves of the University
258Henry Blackburn, M.D., N Engl J Med 1996;334:984-986
259\FDA Panel Member Voice [sic] Olestra Concerns," USA Today, April 11, 1996
260Id.
261Id.
262Ken Silverstein, \How the Chips Fell," Mother Jones, May/June 1997
263See Ken Silverstein, \Washington on $10 Million a Day," Common Courage Press, 1998, p.58
264Michael Jacobson and Leila Corcoran, \Snack Attack: Olestra," The Center for Science in the Public Interest, March, 1998
83of Minnesota School of Public Health. \It was a triumph of marketing over health concerns. The marketing
people out-shouted the health people."265
FDA spokesman Jim O'Hara defended the FDA's review process, describing them as a \very open and pub-
lic debate" about olestra. He also attempted to defuse criticism of the panel's composition. \The advisory
committee's recommendations are just that: they are advisory. It is the agency that made its decision."266
O'Hara's comments left unanswered a larger, more important question: even if it was the Agency that made
the decision, was the decision made for the right reasons? The FDA's decision did not occur in a vacuum.
Procter & Gamble conducted an intensive political and public relations campaign to shape the debate and
inuence the decision-making process.
PROCTER & GAMBLE'S SCIENTISTS
Just as the tobacco industry paid scientists to write to the EPA,267 Procter & Gamble engineered a massive
eort to recruit scientists as advocates for their product. In the brief period between the committee's
adjournment on November 19 and the December 1 deadline for public comments, the FDA received nearly
800 letters concerning olestra. Most were from health professionals recommending that the product not
be approved. But many others were the product of a Procter & Gamble-sponsored letter-writing drive. To
ensure that it conveyed the appearance of at least some support from the scientic and medical communities,
265Id.
266\FDA Panel Member Voice [sic] Olestra Concerns," USA Today, April 11, 1996
267D. Hanners, \Scientists Were Paid to Write Letters { Tobacco Industry Sought to Discredit EPA Report," Pioneer
Planet/St.Paul Press, August 4, 1998. See also Philip Morris Report, \IAQ Goals," January 25, 1993, Philip Morris ID
2023206195/6198.
84P&G wrote to dozens of scientists, asking that they write letters to the FDA on its behalf during an extended
period for public comments. Many of the 26 scientists who complied had been paid consultants to P&G.
Procter & Gamble denies that its nancial generosity toward scientists and academics is any cause for
concern. \These are known academics and health researchers who have built reputations for sound science
over their careers," said P&G spokeswoman Jacqui d'Eon. \They are not going to be bought."268 If they
are not going to be bought, however, that doesn't seem to have prevented Procter & Gamble from trying.
Certainly the example of the tobacco industry should serve as a note of caution of the dangers of scientic
conict of interest. And not all observers feel P&G's scientist selection process is neutral. John Stauber,
editor of PR Watch, a newsletter which covers the public relations industry, says that P&G hires people
\who appear to have some distance from the company, but they are carefully selected and can be counted
on to promote the ocial line. There's nothing objective or independent about them."269
Marion Nestle of New York University's nutrition department was one of the many scientists who turned
down Procter & Gamble's overtures. She declined an oer of $1,000 from P&G, for which she was to y
to New Orleans, give a short speech and eat products made with olestra to demonstrate her condence in
its safety. Dozens of other academics accepted P&G's money and went to New Orleans, a favorite tourist
destination. \It's too crude or imprecise to say people are bought o," Nestle told a reporter from the Boston
Phoenix. \But I just know if somebody is giving my department money, then I would think twice before
saying something mean about that particular industry."270
268Ken Silverstein, \How the Chips Fell," Mother Jones, May/June 1997
269Ken Silverstein, \Procter & Gamble's Academic `White Hats,"' Multinational Monitor, November, 1997, Volume 18, Num-
ber 11
270Id.
85PEER-REVIEWED JOURNALS
Like the tobacco industry, Procter & Gamble has made a concerted eort to place industry-friendly research
in peer-reviewed scientic journals. Procter & Gamble's nancial clout has clearly facilitated this goal. For
instance, in October of 1996 the International Life Sciences Institute (ILSI) held a conference on fat and sugar
substitutes held in Arlington, Virginia. Panelists at the conference included P&G scientist John Peters, and
P&G consultants Penny Kris-Etherton of Penn State and John Foreyt of the Baylor College of Medicine, as
well as representatives from food industry giants like Kraft Foods and Nabisco, both of which stood to reap
nancial benets from olestra's approval. The attendance of P&G scientists at this particular conference
was not coincidental; P&G sits on the Institute's Board of Directors, is a major nancial supporter of the
ILSI, and helped to underwrite for the conference.271 The proceedings of the conference were later published
as a bound volume in the Annals of the New York Academy of Science, which are distributed to more than
700 libraries and, according to the Academy, \are among the oldest and most frequently cited sources of
scientic research."272 As a result, studies on P&G products which were produced by paid P&G consultants
and received by a P&G-funded organization at a P&G-funded conference have now been entered, mostly
anonymously, into the ranks of peer-reviewed scientic literature.
FUNDING THE CONGRESS
Though less visible than the tobacco industry, Procter & Gamble is a prodigious political force in Washington,
with a full-time lobbying sta and a governmental relations arm which vigilantly guards its interests on
Capitol Hill. P&G's political action committee contributes hundreds of thousands of dollars to candidates
271George Hardy, ILSI's executive director, would not reveal the amount of P&G's contribution.
272Ken Silverstein, \Procter & Gamble's Academic `White Hats,"' Multinational Monitor, November, 1997, Volume 18, Num-
ber 11
86each election cycle, and its executives, lawyers and lobbyists contribute thousands more. During the 1997-
1998 election cycle, P&G gave $25,000 in soft money donations,273 part of the $161,700 it gave overall.274
Like the tobacco industry, P&G focused its contributions on the leadership of the two parties.
PROCTER & GAMBLE HARD MONEY DONATIONS, 1997-2000275
Senate Republican
Majority Leadership
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President
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Republican Senatorial
Committee, Chair
Bill Frist (R-TN) $5,000
273Federal Election Commission data, see www.tray.com/fecinfo/98lbst/oh $$.htm
274The Center for Responsive Politics, see http://www.opensecrets.org/states/contribs98/OH.asp
275The Center for Responsive Politics, see http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/pacgot/1998/00257329.htm
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89Procter & Gamble's pattern of corporate giving is more opportunistic than it is ideological. Because it was
unclear to political oddsmakers which party would control the Congress after the 2000 elections, Procter &
Gamble gave generously to the potential Speakers of the House (Reps. Gephardt and Hastert) from both
parties. Likewise, in the 2000 cycle alone, P&G's PAC gave $5000, the legal maximum, to Rep. Charles
Rangel (D-NY), a liberal African-American from Harlem. Rangel is stood to be Chairman of the powerful
Ways and Means Committee if the Democrats reclaimed the House.
Like its counterparts in the tobacco industry, P&G made a dramatic shift in its giving patterns when the
Congress changed hands in 1994. Where before the company had expressed a mild preference for Republican
candidates (explained perhaps in part by P&G's home state in Republican-leaning Ohio), after the Repub-
lican sweep of 1994, P&G's giving became heavily weighted toward the GOP.
Procter & Gamble Federal Campaign Contributions by Election Cycle:
Year P&G Contributions % Given to
Republicans
1992 $124,850 54%
1994 $187,075 54%
1996 $221,384 81%
1998 $199,750 84%
2000 $272,140 79%
Procter & Gamble is also a major contributor to state-level politicians and political organizations, giving both
under its own name and through other groups. For instance, Procter & Gamble is a major supporter (along
with DuPont, Dow, Eastman Kodak, General Electric Plastics, and Exxon) of the American Chemistry
Council (ACC), a trade association that provides additional nancial support to a number of groups P&G
90supports on its own { including Consumer Alert and the American Legislative Exchange Council.276
USING THE CONGRESS TO LOBBY THE FDA
Just as the tobacco industry's most loyal supporters, like Mitch McConnell (R-KY) and Jim Bunning (R-KY)
hail from tobacco-producing states, Cincinnati-based Procter & Gamble has received some of its strongest
support from Ohio's congressional delegation. Like the tobacco industry, Procter & Gamble has cemented
that relationship by generously supporting the ocials of its home state.
Procter & Gamble Campaign Contributions to the Ohio Congressional Delegation:
Member P&G Donations, 1997-2000
Boehner,
John
A
(R-
OH)
$4,500
Chabot, Steve (R-OH) $10,000
DeWine,
Mike
(R-
OH)
$6,000
Gillmor, Paul E (R-OH) $2,000
Hall,
Tony
P
(D-
OH)
$1,500
Hobson, David L (R-OH) $3,500
276\American Chemistry Council," The Environmental Working Group, Washington D.C., January 10, 2001
91Hollister, Nancy (R-OH) $5,000
Kasich, John R (R-OH) $2,500
LaTourette, Steven C (R-OH) $1,000
Ney, Bob (R-OH) $500
Oxley, Michael G (R-OH) $2,000
Pryce, Deborah (R-OH) $4,000
Sawyer, Tom (D-OH) $2,500
Tiberi, Pat (R-OH) $1,500
Voinovich, George V (R-OH) $11,000
Like the tobacco industry, Procter & Gamble beneted from the spirited advocacy of its favored legislators {
especially in its dealings with the FDA. In February of 1995, Sens. John Glenn (D-OH) and Michael DeWine
(R-OH), and Reps. John Boehner (R-OH) 277, Steve Chabot (R-OH) (all of whom received money from
P&G's political action committee), and Rob Portman (R-OH) (who doesn't accept PAC money but took
contributions from P&G executives) wrote a joint letter to Health and Human Services Secretary Donna
Shalala.278 In it they argued that olestra was safe and that the FDA approval should be expedited. The
Ohio delegation's letter made the obligatory concession that the public health was more important than
prots, but noted that olestra's approval would mean $17.8 billion to Ohio over the next thirteen years.279
Observers might think it natural, even desirable, that Ohio legislators would act as advocates for one of the
largest employers in their state. But evidence strongly suggests that Procter & Gamble expects a quid pro
quo for its campaign contributions. When home-state legislators refuse to carry water for Procter & Gamble,
the company has proved its willingness to strong-arm members of Congress. In 1998, Rep. Bob Ney (R-OH)
reported that R. Scott Miller, who heads Procter & Gamble's political action arm, had threatened to cut
o campaign contributions in retaliation for Ney's votes on international trade. In a letter to Procter &
277Rep. John Boehner (R-OH) is another of the repeat players in the tobacco and olestra stories. Boehner actually distributed
checks from tobacco giant Brown & Williamson to Members on the oor of the House of Representatives, a violation of House
rules for which he was disciplined. See \Boehner's Blunder: Handing Out PAC Money Makes a Poor Floor Show, Leader
Learns," Cincinnati Enquirer, May 23, 1996, p. A18
278Ken Silverstein, \How the Chips Fell," Mother Jones, May/June 1997
279See Ken Silverstein, \Washington on $10 Million a Day," Common Courage Press, 1998, p.59
92Gamble CEO John Pepper, Rep. Ney wrote that Miller \told a member of my sta, in no uncertain terms,
that contributions to my campaign were directly reduced because of my stance against Fast Track [trade
legislation] and future contributions have been completely put in jeopardy due to my decision to vote against
Most Favored Nation status for China."280
Bill Dobson, Procter & Gamble's vice president of international public aairs, said there was \absolutely no
intent" to suggest nancial contributions were tied to how Ney voted on specic legislation, and attributed
the exchange to a \simple misunderstanding."281 Ney bristled at that suggestion. "This is the most blatant
correlation of campaign contributions and votes," he said. \If [Miller] said we won't support you, that's ne.
This was a denite statement: `You should notice your contributions have dwindled, future contributions
are in jeopardy."'282
There is little public evidence to suggest that P&G employed such heavy-handed tactics in 1995, when
olestra was facing its FDA review. In fact, Frank Cremeans, (R-OH), one of the only members of Congress
to publicly comment on being subjected to P&G's olestra lobbying campaigns, was eusive in his praise. \I
knew very little about it, I'm not a chemist," he said. \They came in and explained it to me, how it worked
and it was very helpful."283 Cremeans, however, seems to have been an easy sale for P&G. Perhaps the rest
of Ohio's delegation was as easy to convince. For more reluctant members, the process may have borne more
resemblance to Rep. Ney's experience with P&G than to Rep. Cremeans'.
280\Congressman Complains of Extortion By Contributor," Associated Press, July 13, 1998, available at
http://www.publicampaign.org/news/news7 13 98.html
281Bill Straub, \Lobbyists Practice Art of Subtle Pressure," The Cincinnati Post, July 15, 1998
282\Congressman Complains of Extortion By Contributor," Associated Press, July 13, 1998, available at
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283Bill Straub, \Lobbyists Practice Art of Subtle Pressure," The Cincinnati Post, July 15, 1998
93LOBBYING FOR OLESTRA
Procter & Gamble spent enormous sums on lobbying on average more than $3,000,000 each year between
1997 and 1999.284 While P&G maintains a full-time lobbying sta in Washington (among them R. Scott
Miller), it recognized that lobbying for olestra would be especially delicate. To carry its olestra campaign to
Capitol Hill, P&G retained Carol Tucker Foreman, a former Assistant Secretary of Agriculture in the Carter
administration and the founder of the Safe Food Coalition.285 Carol Tucker Foreman's Democratic Party
credentials were impeccable, particularly in the Clinton era; her brother, Jim Guy Tucker, was Lieutenant
Governor of Arkansas under Clinton, and moved to the governor's mansion after Clinton won the presidency.
Her status as founder of the Safe Food Coalition only enhanced her credibility in endorsing olestra's safety.
Foreman's Safe Food Coalition is not a front group; it has actually been a strong voice for consumers,
speaking out on salmonella poisoning, for instance.286 But like many in the Washington lobbying community,
Foreman wears more than one mask. In 1994, it emerged that Foreman had been discreetly lobbying on
behalf of Monsanto and its controversial recombinant bovine growth hormone.287 Foreman also lobbied for
Philip Morris.288 As a lobbyist for olestra, she seemed a perfect t: she had personal connections with
the Democratic Party and the White House, and credibility on food safety with the media, but was not so
moralistic in her approach toward clients that she couldn't be trusted.
Because Procter & Gamble had already secured a hearing before the FDA, there was no need for P&G to rally
all of the company's supporters in Congress. Foreman's task was more focused: she had merely to convince
those members of Congress who had concerns about the product that the FDA was capable of making
284\Addicting Congress: Drug Companies' Campaign Cash & Lobbying Expenses," Public Citizen, July 2000, Appendix B
285\Procter & Gamble's Academic `White Hats,"' Ken Silverstein, Multinational Monitor, November, 1997, Volume 18, Num-
ber 11
286\Safe Food Coalition Charges USDA Proposal to Allow Retained Water in Poultry is an Attempt to Cover Eco-
nomic Adulteration in a Cloak of Faux Food Safety," Safe Food Coalition, Press Release, January 14, 1999. Available at
http://www.consumersunion.org/food/0114sfcdc399.htm
287See \The 1995 Lobbying Hall of Shame," Multinational Monitor, January/February 1996
288\Will CFA Save GM Foods?" PR Watch, Volume 7, No. 2, Second Quarter, 2000
94all the proper determinations. Of particular concern for Procter & Gamble was rst-term Congresswoman
Julia Carson (D-IN), who P&G targeted for intensive lobbying. Carson's Indiana district includes much of
Indianapolis, one of olestra's original test markets. After receiving numerous complaints about olestra from
her constituents, many of whom experienced intense gastrointestinal problems, Rep. Carson threatened to
introduce legislation strengthening the warning label.289 \We need to do a new, complete and independent
review of olestra and its side eects," she declared.290 Carson also called for more prominent warning labels
on products made with olestra; a more conscious eort by the snack industry to take care in the marketing of
olestra-based snacks, especially with children; and a public awareness campaign warned potential consumers
of snacks made with olestra to the potential side eects of the product.291 \It is apparent to me and other
residents of Indianapolis that olestra can do serious harm. My duty to my constituents is to assure that their
public health is not at risk," Carson said in a prepared statement to the press. \The implications for using
olestra on a nationwide basis is [sic] also at stake. The eects of olestra on the citizens of Indianapolis need to
be examined thoroughly before expanding the use of this product to other communities across America."292
The potential for negative publicity { even Congressional hearings { posed a tremendous threat to the
olestra's protability. P&G sent lobbyists to her oce to get her to stop and even hired former Secretary of
Health and Human Services Louis Sullivan to call her. Sullivan called an old friend, Rep. Carson's personal
physician in Indianapolis, to help arrange a meeting. Though Carson's doctor convinced her to meet with
Sullivan and listen to his arguments on olestra, Sullivan had little success. Instead, Carson attacked P&G
in public for trying to mue her. \It's irresponsible for P&G to try to impede my investigation," said
Carson, \and my support of constituents who have had stomach cramps."293 P&G, of course, denied trying
to impede her investigation. Rep. Carson failed to convince any other Members to join her call for hearings,
289\Rep. Carson Calls For Action on Olestra," Press Release, Congresswoman Julia Carson, July 15, 1997
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95and her ght died a quiet death.294
EFFECTS OF CONGRESSIONAL PRESSURE
The letter from the Ohio delegation and the intensive lobbying on Capitol Hill had the desired eect: pressure
from the Congress and from the Department of Health and Human Services was felt acutely by the FDA
panelists that reviewed olestra's application. \They were under intense pressure from Congress to get o
the backs of industry," said Dr. Walter Willett, head of the department of nutrition at the Harvard School
of Public Health.295 In recent years this pressure has come not only from Procter & Gamble, but from
regulated industries generally. In an anonymous September 1998 survey conducted by Public Citizen, FDA
Medical Ocers were asked how they would compare the current standards of FDA review for safety and
ecacy to those in existence prior to 1995. Seventeen Medical Ocers described the current standards as
\lower" or \much lower," while thirteen described them as \about the same" and six described them as
\higher." None described the standards as \much higher."296
Nineteen Medical Ocers stated that the pressure on them to approve a greater proportion of new drugs
was \somewhat greater" or \much greater" compared to the
period prior to 1995.297 One Medical Ocer reported, \In the last 2 years, I recommended that two drugs
not be approved. They were both approved without consulting me. This never happened before. In one
294Rep. Carson did face a bruising battle for reelection, in which she was attacked with vicious negative advertisements.
Republican Gary Hofmeister ran a series of attack ads against Carson, including a 30-second ad that featured the face of
Representative Carson (who is black) morphing into images of prison doors and hypodermic needles. It is unclear, however, if
Carson's role as an olestra antagonist was responsible for her well-funded opponents. See Joshua Micah Marshall, \The Firewall
Next Time," The American Prospect, January 31, 2000
295George Srait, \Fight Over a Fat Substitute," ABCNEWS.com, June 10, 1998
296Statement by Sidney M. Wolfe, M.D., Director, Public Citizen's Health Research Group, FDA Science Forum on Biotech-
nology, December 9, 1998
297Id.
96case, the drug did not meet the standards set up by the division, so they nullied the standards."298
With the implicit support of a hostile Republican Congress, direct industry lobbying of FDA ocials has
increased: nine Medical Ocers reported a total of 23 inappropriate phone calls regarding a drug they were
reviewing, usually from the sponsor.299 And senior ocials in the FDA have contributed to the pressure on
their subordinates. Eight Medical Ocers reported instances in which they had been instructed, usually by
the Oce Director, not to present their own opinion or data to an FDA Advisory Committee when to do so
might have reduced the likelihood that a drug would be approved.300
One Medical Ocer stated: \My feeling after more than 20 years at FDA is that unless drugs can be shown
to kill patients outright then they will be approved with revised labeling and box warning."301 Evidence
suggests that this attitude played at least some role in the decision to approve olestra and the way in which
that approval was granted.
ATTACKING OLESTRA'S ENEMIES
The most prominent critic of olestra and the process by which it was approved was the Center for Science in
the Public Interest (CSPI). Under its director, Michael Jacobson, CSPI had earned an impressive reputation
as a public health watchdog, making headlines for its exposes on fast food restaurants and junk food. While
Procter & Gamble sought to reassure a wary public, Jacobson and his organization opened up telephone
hotlines for suerers of olestra-related \anal leakage" and \fecal urgency," and held press conferences where
they voiced their concerns.
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97Despite the FDA's approval of olestra, high-ranking Agency ocials made little eort to hide their sympathy
for CSPI's battle against olestra. FDA deputy commissioner William Schultz said that CSPI sta \were
the only ones there raising the right questions."302 CSPI's scientic credibility was further underscored in
1996 when FDA Commissioner David Kessler honored Michael Jacobson with the agency's highest award,
the Commissioner's Special Citation. The citation read, \For helping government, industry, and the public
understand the relationship between diet and health, and, in doing so, accomplishing one of the great public
health advances of the century."303 Procter & Gamble was keenly aware of the danger that an outspoken
campaign against olestra { particularly one which focused on its embarrassing side eects - could pose. Even
after initial FDA approval was secured, CSPI posed a serious threat to the protability of olestra. In a
worst-case scenario, if sucient public outcry were raised, the FDA might even reconsider its approval, or
add further conditions.
Like the tobacco industry, Procter & Gamble's rst impulse was to move against CSPI on their own. Greg
Allgood, a senior P&G scientist, called the statements of CSPI President Michael Jacobson \ridiculous."
\It's not supported by any scientic facts," Allgood told United Press International. \What he's saying is
false. He has a passion to limit food options for people. That's his track record. He goes after all kinds of
foods. I would think people are getting tired of hearing about Michael Jacobson's press conferences."304 P&G
spokesman Don Tassone distilled the message into an even simpler formula: \CSPI is obviously interested
in sound bites, not sound science."305
302Center for Science in the Public Interest, Letter to the Editor of The New Republic, January 8, 1997,
http://www.cspinet.org/new/newrepb.html
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304United Press International, October 23, 1996
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98These comments telegraphed Procter & Gamble's public relations strategy: rather than argue the scientic
merits of the debate, they would attempt to discredit CSPI, depicting the organization as ideologically driven
and extreme. To manage their \perception" problem, Procter & Gamble called on Hill & Knowlton, the
same Washington D.C. public relations rm that created the \smearing and belittling" plan for the tobacco
industry (see p.71).306 Shortly thereafter a coordinated strategy emerged.
USING FRONT GROUPS
At a conference of public relations experts in November of 1996, Je Prince, formerly of the National Restau-
rant Association, identied the Center for Science in the Public Interest as a threat to the protability of the
food industry. Prince urged CSPI's foes to \put out the money" needed for a campaign that would under-
mine the Center's credibility.307 Just as Philip Morris had coordinated a campaign of \allied attacks, where
friendly third parties are engaged on our side but without direct or obvious connection to the industry,"308
Prince urged an oensive that employed industry front groups: \The companies and industries that wish
to undermine [CSPI's] credibility can best do so working together to make a case that is partially removed
from their own immediate interests," said Prince. 309 Prince's reasoning followed Philip Morris' to a tee:
\If it is the National Restaurant Association and Proctor & Gamble out there making the case, nobody is
going to believe them. Their ox has been gored." 310
And just as Philip Morris CEO Hamish Maxwell stressed cooperation with major media outlets (\The sixth
point I want to make is that we are not using our considerable clout with the media. A number of media
306Art Levine, \Food Fight in Indianapolis," U.S. News, May 5, 1997
307Joel Bleifuss, \Food Flacks Say: Skip the Science," PR Watch, Volume 3, No.4, Third Quarter, 1996
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309Joel Bleifuss, \Food Flacks Say: Skip the Science," PR Watch, Volume 3, No.4, Third Quarter, 1996
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99proprietors that I have spoken to are sympathetic to our position,"311), Prince suggested that media would
be receptive to attacks on consumer advocates: \The whole project would... require considerable skill in
media management and almost innite tact, but through a concerted eort I think it could be done, because
the press no longer wants to believe CSPI. They would like to nd an excuse not to carry those stories,
but we haven't given it to them yet. It may well be a job for some currently underfunded organization, or
perhaps for some new organization, but it seems to me the food industry ought to get together and get this
job done soon."312
The food industry { and particularly Proctor & Gamble { was listening. Almost immediately after Prince's
lecture, a well-organized and well-funded coalition against CSPI coalesced. P&G had a ready supply of
potential allies; it had long been a supporter of numerous industry front groups,313 and a range of surrogates
moved to take up the defense of olestra { and a series of withering attacks on olestra's critics.
The Hoover Institution's Henry Miller, who had proposed the eective dismantling of the FDA during its
battle with the tobacco industry, leapt to the defense of olestra. Miller wrote a blistering op-ed attack on
CSPI that ran in The Wall Street Journal, and was subsequently republished by the Washington Times314
and The Cincinnati Inquirer. Miller lauded the FDA for approving olestra and called the fat substitute
\perhaps the most tested food in history."315 Another pu piece was entitled \Yes, There is Free Lunch {
311\The Perspective of PM International on Smoking and Health Issues: Text of the discussion docu-
ment used at the meeting of top management," Internal Memorandum, Philip Morris, 1985, available at
http://www.media-awareness.ca/eng/news/news/two/rupsmoke.htm
312Joel Bleifuss, \Food Flacks Say: Skip the Science," PR Watch, Volume 3, No.4, Third Quarter, 1996
313Mark Megalli and Andy Friedman, Masks of Deception: Corporate Front Groups in America: Essential Information, 1991)
, p. 4; Richard Stapleton, 'Green vs. green', National Parks (November/December 1992), pp.184-185. Other Procter &
Gamble front groups include The Keep America Beautiful Campaign, an organization that focuses on anti-litter campaigns
and downplays the potential of recycling legislation and changes to packaging. The Keep America Beautiful Campaign receives
approximately $2 million per year from \some 200 companies that manufacture and distribute the aluminum cans, paper
products, glass bottles and plastics that account for about a third of the material in US landlls." In addition to Procter &
Gamble, the Campaign's board of directors include representatives of Philip Morris, Mobil Chemical and Procter and Gamble
and PR giant Burson-Marsteller. See Michael Parenti, \Inventing Reality: The Politics of the Mass Media," (New York: St
Martin's Press, 1986) , p. 73l.
314Henry Miller, The Washington Times, July 25, 1996
315Miller didn't mention that P&G's tests of olestra were conducted almost exclusively on healthy people between the ages
of 18 and 44, hardly a representative sample, or that the longest consecutive testing period for children was one week, with
children consuming less than the equivalent of one ounce of potato chips per day.
100Fat Free."316 Miller ran another similar article in the Washington Times in 1998, writing, \As a solution
to Americans' constantly-expanding waistlines and fat consumption, olestra is the closest thing to a free
lunch."317 In none of the articles did Miller note that Procter & Gamble was a generous nancial supporter
of the Hoover Institution.
Norman Ornstein joined the attack on CSPI with a column that appeared in USA Today.318 Ornstein be-
littled concerns about olestra, noting that while the fat substitute can cause diarrhea, \beans can cause gas
and... hot peppers and Tabasco sauce can give me heartburn."319 Once again, P&G's surrogate followed a
consistent message, which ignored the health debate and instead focused on the eorts of a self-appointed
elite to constrain \consumer choice." Ornstein asserted that CSPI had attempted to \intimidate" the FDA
into blocking olestra, and accused the Center of trying to be a \national nanny."320 Ornstein's byline re-
vealed that he is a Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), but failed to note that AEI receives
about $125,000 annually from P&G's foundation,321 or that P&G's Chief Executive Ocer, John Pepper,
sits on AEI's Board of Directors.322
CONSUMER ALERT
Another eager combatant in the campaign against CSPI was Consumer Alert. Consumer Alert's name and
316Henry Miller, Yes, There Is a Free Lunch{Fat-Free, San Jose Mercury News, Nov. 15, 1995
317Henry I. Miller, \The Cutting Edge of Cutting Calories," The Washington Times, April 16, 1998
318Norman Ornstein, USA Today, August 1, 1996
319Id.
320Id.
321\From Leather Boots to Velvet Gloves," Corporate Watch, Issue 11, Summer 2000
322Ken Silverstein, \Corporate Enemies, Corporate Friends," EXTRA! May, 1997
101self-description (it calls itself a \free market consumer group," that \has members in all 50 states,"323) are
benign enough that it is frequently quoted by unsuspecting journalists as an independent voice on consumer
health. On its website, www.consumeralert.org, the ubiquitous Dr. Henry Miller of the Hoover Institution
boldly proclaims that \Consumer Alert is everything that most other self-styled consumerist organizations
are not: scholarly, scientic, honest, and motivated not by self-interest, but by the public interest."324
The endorsement Henry Miller may provide some indication about the true loyalties of Consumer Alert. In
fact, Consumer Alert is funded by some decidedly self-interested parties { including Pzer Pharmaceuticals,
Philip Morris, American Cyanamid, Eli Lilly, Monsanto, Upjohn, the Chemical Manufacturers Association,
and Ciba-Geigy.325 It serves as an industry counterweight to genuine consumer groups like Consumers Union.
Consumer Alert (a noted friend of the tobacco industry; see pp. 67-68) eagerly joined the attack on CSPI,
blast-faxing press releases and writing op-ed pieces. One press release was entitled (appropriately enough)
\CSPI Throws Consumer Choice Down the Toilet."326 In another variation on the CSPI-as-paternalist
theme, Consumer Alert's John Berlau wrote, \In a free society, consumers should have the right to decide
if olestra is right for them, and the self-appointed `Food Police' should not be allowed to throw consumer
choice down the toilet."327
In December of 1996, Consumer Alert's Sarah Durkin and James Plummer wrote an article in the Detroit
News that again referred to CSPI as the \food police," and argued that CSPI \aggressively ignores the
323See http://www.consumeralert.org/
324See http://www.consumeralert.org/
325John Stauber, \Trust Us, We're Experts! How Industry Manipulates Science and Gambles With Your Future," Tra-
cher/Putnam, 2001.
326\CSPI Throws Consumer Choice Down the Toilet," Consumer Alert press release, Washington, D.C.: Consumer Alert,
July 1, 1996
327John Berlau, \Cursing the Cure for Fatty Food," Consumer Alert, available at
http://www.consumeralert.org/issues/food/berestra.htm. This follows almost exactly the game plan set our by Je
Prince, the public relations consultant. \The second thing the restaurants have pushed, of course, is the 'food police' line, and
they push that as far as possible," Prince said. \The idea is simply that people... don't need a third party interfering and
making those choices for them especially when this third party seems inhuman, inexible, puritanical, rigid." See Joel Bleifuss,
\Food Flacks Say: Skip the Science," PR Watch, Volume 3, No.4, Third Quarter, 1996
102ability of consumers to weigh the pros and cons of eating various foods without the uninvited opinion of
nutrition activists."328 At one point they went so far as to declare \It is clear that the center has a nutrition
mission that lacks any eort to educate the public about what a truly healthy diet is. Rather than oer
examples of how much fat is necessary to maintain good health, and how to make food choices to avoid
eating too much fat, the center chooses to push an aggressive agenda designed to scare the public into a
predominantly vegetarian and granola diet."329
The Detroit News piece was little more than an ad hominem attack; CSPI has never endorsed a granola diet.
The clear purpose of the article was to paint CSPI as a radical group, without addressing the scientic merits
of the issues they raised. Consumer Alert's website echoed the same core message, counseling consumers
to \Decide for yourself if they taste as good as the real thing. But don't let Luddite busybodies decide
for you.\330 The goal is clear: to shift the focus of the debate from Procter & Gamble's product to the
motivations of its critics, by enlisting a kind of crude populism.
Durkin and Plummer identied themselves as \policy analyst[s] at Consumer Alert, a Washington-based
consumer group," and admitted no aliation with Procter & Gamble. Indeed, there is as yet no hard
evidence (leaked internal memoranda, for instance) that Consumer Alert's campaign was conducted at the
behest of Procter & Gamble. Their timing, however, was suspiciously well-coordinated, and their argument,
was strikingly similar to Je Prince's advice that industry, through third parties, assert that \people... don't
need a third party interfering and making those choices for them."331
328Ken Silverstein, \Corporate Enemies, Corporate Friends," EXTRA! May, 1997
329Sarah Durkin and James Plummer, \Guess Who's Not Coming to Dinner?" The Detroit News, December 1, 1996
330\Who are the Food Police?" See http://detnews.com/1996/menu/stories/77247.htm
331Ken Silverstein, \Corporate Enemies, Corporate Friends," EXTRA! May, 1997
103COORDINATION FROM ABOVE
There is other evidence to suggest that Procter & Gamble's surrogates did not hit on the same themes
and develop the same strategy by coincidence. Like the letters to the FDA that were penned by tobacco
lobbyists and signed by Republican governors (see pp. 40-41), the texts produced by Procter & Gamble's
allies show suspicious signs of having been coordinated from above by a single source. Henry Miller's Wall
Street Journal op-ed, the Consumer Alert piece in the Detroit News, and an article by Stephen Glass in
The New Republic all contain virtually identical phrases and diction.332 Either media attention to CSPI has
been marked by rampant plagiarism, or the pieces seem to have been written from the same set of talking
points.333
332For direct comparisons of the language, see http://www.cspinet.org/new/reeks.html
333In the case of Stephen Glass, plagiarism seems to have been at least part of the story. His career was destroyed amid the
revelation that he had plagiarized and fabricated numerous stories in the course of his work as a freelance writer. For more on
his plagiarism, see http://www.interlog.com/rmcginn/Glassindex.htm
104Henry Miller, The Wall Street
Journal, July 11, 1996
Stephen Glass, \Hazardous to
Your Mental Health," The New
Republic, December 30, 1996
\[CSPI's] budget is funded mostly by
$24-a-year subscriptions to its Nutri-
tion Action Healthletter, a newslet-
ter that has seen its circulation triple
since 1991 to 800,000. Keeping that
circulation up requires a lot of hype."
\In a drive to boost the newslet-
ter subscriptions that are its primary
source of revenue, the center has
increasingly tended to abandon the
scientic method in favor of media
hype... Since 1991, the newsletter's
circulation has tripled. At $24 per
year... Now about three-quarters of
CSPI's funding comes from the pub-
lication."
\Mr. Jacobson was quoted in a Los
Angeles Times Magazine article last
year as telling one of his newsletter
writers `to be more direct by remov-
ing \weasel words" { qualiers such
as \suggests" and \maybe."
\According to a report, Jacobson
instructed CSPI's nutrition direc-
tor `to be more direct by removing
\weasel words" { qualiers such as
\suggests" and \maybe" from the
newsletter."
The Detroit News, December
1, 1996, by Consumer Alert
Stephen Glass, \Hazardous to
Your Mental Health," The New
Republic, December 30, 1996
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\Certainly an occasional `splurge' is
no cause for self-loathing or even
fear of clogged arteries."
\... what they regularly eat { rather
than the occasional splurge { is far
more important."
STEVEN MILLOY AND \JUNK SCIENCE"
107Not all the attacks from industry front groups were directed at CSPI. Procter & Gamble's public relations
campaign also directed its eorts at Dr. Henry Blackburn, one of the most vehement dissenters on the
FDA review committee, and a man whose scientic reputation and outspokenness about olestra made him
a potential threat to long-term protability { and far more dicult to ridicule and belittle than Michael
Jacobson and CSPI.
Steven Milloy, however, was up to the task. The operator of junkscience.com, a website dedicated to exposing
practitioners of \junk science" and debunking their claims, Milloy attacked both Blackburn's science and his
integrity. Addressing the olestra controversy and Dr. Blackburn's New England Journal of Medicine article,
Milloy wrote:
Apparently, one of Blackburn's public health concerns is that Olestra [sic] may leach certain vitamins from
the body, including vitamins A, D, E, and K. At least some of the concern with this leaching is that
these antioxidant vitamins are thought to play a role in preventing cancer. News ash to Blackburn....Beta
Carotene and Vitamin A Cause Lung Cancer in Major Study! [J Natl Cancer Inst 1996;88:145- 6]. I think
it's fairly safe to conclude that no one really knows the true association (one way or the other) between
vitamin intake and cancer.334
No serious scientists would endorse the positions that Milloy takes in the above paragraph; these are specious
and irresponsible claims. But Milloy is not acting in any ocial capacity as a P&G spokesman, and any
scientic errors or misrepresentations he makes are his alone. This is not an accident. Like Rosser Reeves
suggested to the tobacco companies in 1967, Procter & Gamble has assembled a roster of \janissaries" {
Milloy among them { who can make materially false scientic claims for the company's benet without any
risk of P&G being held responsible.
Though the premise behind the Junkscience.com website is the \debunking" of fraudulent and overblown
334See http://www.junkscience.com/news/olestra.html
108scientic claims, Milloy's essays contain little in the way of serious scientic argument, and are instead geared
toward attacking Blackburn personally. Just as Consumer Alert did in its attacks on CSPI, Milloy seeks
to ridicule and lampoon Blackburn as a radical. At one point Milloy writes, \It appears that Blackburn's
standard of proof is so high that it could never be met. Blackburn would prevent virtually any new product
from ever coming on the market."335 Later, Milloy asks rhetorically, \Is Blackburn really concerned about
public health? Or, is his protestation against olestra a facade covering anti-technology sentiment? Could it
be that he has taken a page from the Unabomber's manifesto and applied it to public health?"336 Ridicule
has long been a weapon of Milloy's; after yet another researcher published a study linking secondhand smoke
to cancer, Milloy wrote in 1997 that she \must have pictures of journal editors in compromising positions
with farm animals. How else can you explain her studies seeing the light of day?"337
MILLOY, TOBACCO, AND PROCTER & GAMBLE
Steven Milloy is not merely an independent operator; he is a professional, and a gure whose role in both the
tobacco industry eort and P&G's olestra campaign helps to explain the similarities between the two. Milloy
was previously employed by a number of professional public relations and lobbying companies, including
Multinational Business Services, which was Phillip Morris's primary lobbyist on the environmental tobacco
smoke issue in late 1992, when Milloy worked there. In addition to being an \adjunct fellow" at the Cato
Institute (which has a history of advocacy on behalf of the tobacco industry; see pp.68-70), and apparently
the only member of an organization called \Citizens For The Integrity of Science" (its registered address is
that of Milloy's home in Potomac, Maryland),338 Milloy is also the Executive Director of The Advancement
335Id.
336Id.
337Sheldon Rampton and John Stauber, \How Big Tobacco Helped Create \the Junkman," PR Watch, Volume 7, No.3, Third
Quarter 2000
338Stewart Fist, \Milloy and the Art of Spin-Doctoring," available at http://www.electric-
words.com/junk/milloy/milloy2.html
109of Sound Science Coalition (TASSC).339
TASSC began as a front group for the tobacco industry, much like Healthy Building International (HBI) or
the Center for Indoor Air Research (CIAR), built on the recognition that explicit connections to the industry
or a single-minded focus on smoking issues would ruin the credibility of the organization and its usefulness
as a front group.340 TASSC was originally created and controlled by APCO Associates, an international
public relations and lobbying company. APCO had been founded in 1984 by Arnold & Porter (the 'AP' in
the APCO name) which was then the primary legal counsel to Philip Morris.341 If the connections seem
tenuous and hard to follow, there is a reason: they were designed to be.
TASSC aimed to redene the rules of proof and standards of epidemiology and toxicology, to a level that
would frustrate eorts by government agencies like the EPA, FDA and OSHA to ever regulate tobacco smoke
in a way that was based on the precautionary principle.342 To this end, TASSC's web site oered examples
of \junk science," alongside a host of entries defending bovine growth hormone, genetically engineered
foodstus, dioxin, electromagnetic elds and endocrine disrupting chemicals.
Milloy joined TASSC in 1997 as its Executive Director, when responsibility for administering TASSC shifted
from APCO to the EOP Group, where Milloy had worked as a lobbyist. The shift had been necessitated
by a minor scandal; in much the same way that Andrew Whist let slip to the Wall Street Journal that
the New York Society for International Aairs was \a chair in my apartment,"343 Neal Cohen, an APCO
lobbyist, had bragged about TASSC's status as an industry front group at a meeting of public relations
339TASSC was originally dubbed the Restoring Integrity to Science Coalition; but was renamed to resemble the venerable
American Association for the Advancement of Science, a legitimate scientic organization.
340Stanton Glantz and Elisa Ong, \Tobacco Industry Eorts Subverting International Agency for Research on Cancer's Second-
Hand Smoke Study," The Lancet, April 8, 2000
341Stewart Fist, \Milloy and the Art of Spin-Doctoring," available at http://www.electric-
words.com/junk/milloy/milloy2.html
342Id.
343Tatiana S. Boncompagni and Jill Abramson, Tobacco- Funded Group Gives Legislators Free Trips, The Wall Street Journal,
August 4, 1997, p. A20.
110experts, and was quoted in the New York Times.344 Since its inception, TASSC has expanded beyond
simply defending the tobacco industry { it also defends other industries whose products are of dubious
safety. It was no coincidence, then, that Milloy came to the defense of olestra - Procter & Gamble is a major
nancial supporter of TASSC.345
Through years of trial and error, the public relations industry has learned that credibility is best achieved
by creating a mixture of truth and falsehood, with legitimate information blended carefully with industry
propaganda. The greatest testimony to the success of Milloy's \junk science" subterfuge is the acclaim it
has received in the mainstream press. The Denver Post has called TASSC an organization \that provides a
much needed balance to the public debate that often surrounds disputed areas of science,"346 while Milloy's
work on the Junk Science Home Page has garnered numerous awards, including being named \One of the
50 Best Web Sites of 1998" by Popular Science; and designation as a \Hot Pick" by Science. The site has
also been recommended by the New York Times, Los Angeles Times, Times of London, Financial Times,
Forbes and MSNBC.347 Outlets that publish Milloy's work have made little eort to probe his background,
or the source of his contrarian scientic positions. Beneath one of his op-ed pieces, the Chicago Sun-Times
described Milloy simply as \a Washington-based business writer specializing in science" who \holds advanced
degrees in health sciences from Johns Hopkins University and a law degree from Georgetown University."348
344Sheldon Rampton and John Stauber, \How Big Tobacco Helped Create \the Junkman," PR Watch, Volume 7, No.3, Third
Quarter 2000
345Stewart Fist, \Milloy and the Art of Spin-Doctoring," available at http://www.electric-words.com/junk/milloy/milloy2.html
TASSC's other supporters include Amoco, Chevron, Dow Chemical, Exxon, General Motors, Lorillard Tobacco, Louisiana
Chemical Association, National Pest Control Association, Occidental Petroleum, Philip Morris Companies, Santa Fe Pacic
Gold, and W.R. Grace.
346See Ken Silverstein, \Washington on $10 Million a Day," Common Courage Press, 1998, p.103
347While the New York Times, for example, was almost certainly duped when it made its recommendation, Forbes has shown
tobacco sympathies before. See pp.77-78.
348Milloy's \advanced degrees in health sciences" actually consist of a bachelor's degree in natural sciences and a master's
degree in biostatistics.
111SUSPICIOUS ENDORSEMENTS
One measure of the scope of Procter & Gamble's olestra campaign is the range of organizations and in-
dividuals whose testimony they oer. Virtually every party to publicly endorse olestra can be traced to
P&G's campaign and P&G's nancial support. Like the tobacco industry, Procter & Gamble has found that
it's easy to make friends if you have money to spread around. Take, for instance, the organizations and
personalities whose endorsements grace the wowchips.com website { a promotional tool for Wow! Chips, a
brand of snack chips that contain olestra. Organizational links on the site include the American Council on
Science and Health (ACSH), the American Dietetic Association (ADA), and the Journal of the American
Medical Association (JAMA).349 Providing endorsements on the site are former Secretary of HHS Louis
Sullivan and the National Consumer's League. The Journal of the American Medical Association has never
endorsed olestra; its presence on the wowchips.com website is simply an act of corporate name-dropping,
one that suggests the JAMA's approval without going so far as to be actionable.350 The other links tell a
more interesting story.
349See http://www.wowchips.com/wowcrowd/links/indexmap.html
350This formula is a favorite public relations tactic. Henry Miller writes, \Widespread use of olestra could enable more Ameri-
cans to adhere to the American Heart Association's recommendation to consume less than 30 percent of total calories from fat."
This formulation implies that the American Heart Association supports olestra's use, when, in fact, it has taken no such position.
See Henry I. Miller, \The Cutting Edge of Cutting Calories," The Washington Times, April 16, 1998. Procter & Gamble also
employ this technique at their olean.com website: \Leading health organizations{including the American Heart Association, the
American Dietetic Association and the American Cancer Society{urge people to cut excess fat and calories as a key step toward
good health." See \One Tool for a Healthier Lifestyle," Procter & Gamble, 1998, at http://www.olean.com/media/media3.html
112THE AMERICAN DIETETIC ASSOCIATION
On the wowchips.com website, the American Dietetic Association oers a glowing review of olestra: \Fat
replacers make it possible for Americans to eat a wide variety of foods without increasing their fat intake,
which may already be too high. These products can help consumers achieve a lower-fat diet while still
enjoying their favorite foods."351 The enthusiastic tone (\favorite foods") { and the willingness of a nutrition
organization to endorse a nutritionally suspect product { seem out of place. This may be because the remarks
were prepared not by an ocer of the ADA, but by Procter & Gamble's own public relations sta.
As part of its olestra marketing campaign, P&G distributed a pro-olestra \fact sheet" from the American
Dietetic Association352 that was virtually identical to P&G's own handouts { a fact which should come as
little surprise, since P&G (which provides signicant annual funding to the ADA) also underwrote the fact
sheet in its entirety.353 In addition to its use at P&G promotional events, the fact sheet was mailed to each of
the 70,000 nutritionists and dietitians who make up the ADA membership { presumably to encourage them
to recommend olestra to their clients. Both P&G and the American Dietetic Association defend the funding
concept. \It's done fairly frequently," P&G's Jacqui d'Eon says, \as a way to get information to professionals
about research that has been done, so they can answer questions they're getting from their clients."354 Nancy
Schwartz, director of the ADA's National Center for Nutrition and Dietetics, explains, \We have a couple
such fact sheets a month, and it's something we've been doing for several years. Companies, even companies
with ties to the product, always fund them. It's how we nance things."355 Schwartz insists that P&G's
involvement in no way inuenced the positive tone of the fact sheet: \Absolutely not. If it were bad news, or
351See http://www.wowchips.com/what/expert/text.html#ADA
352The American Dietetic Association. \Nutrition Fact Sheet: What is olestra?" 1998.
353Ken Silverstein, \How the Chips Fell," Mother Jones, May/June 1997
354Jim Knippenberg, \P&G-funded brochure chews fat on olestra," The Cincinnati Enquirer, November 17, 1996
355Id.
113if there were negative issues involved, yes, certainly we'd communicate it no matter who was funding it."356
Apparently, in the opinion of the ADA, there was simply no bad news about olestra.
THE AMERICAN COUNCIL ON SCIENCE AND HEALTH
Another group which oers its endorsement on the Wow! Chips website is the American Council on Science
and Health (ACSH). While its name suggests a public interest organization, the ACSH is in fact funded
almost exclusively by chemical and food industry interests, and serves primarily as a front group for dis-
seminating industry public relations material. Dr. Elizabeth Whelan, the ACSH's executive director, has
claimed that the US government spends far too much on unproven health risks such as dioxin and pesticides
because of the public's \unfounded fears of man-made chemicals and their perception of these chemicals as
carcinogens."357 She has made such outlandish statements as \There is no such thing as junk food," and
\There is insucient evidence of a relationship between diet and any disease."358 Dr. Whelan is not incom-
petent; she is simply available for rent. The ACSH receives funding from chemical, oil and pharmaceutical
companies like Monsanto, Dow USA, Exxon, and Union Carbide, as well as from food and beverage interest
like Burger King, Coca-Cola, PepsiCo, NutraSweet, Nestle USA { and Procter & Gamble.359
Any doubt that might have existed that the ACSH sees its role as that of industry advocate, rather than
merely an \honest broker" of sound science, was erased with the revelation of an internal 1992 memo. In
that document, Dr. Whelen bemoaned the loss of funding from the Shell Oil Company Foundation: \When
356Id.
357Joel Bleifuss, \Science in the Private Interest: Hiring Flacks to Attack the Facts," PR Watch, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1995 , p.
11; \Public Interest Pretenders," Consumer Reports, Vol. 59, No. 5, 1994 , p. 319; \Misguided Health Priorities Could Aect
Economy," International Insurance Monitor, Vol. 41, No. 6, 1987; \Dr. Blasts US Health care Priorities," Cash Flow, Vol. 91,
No. 47, 1987
358PR Watch, Volume 5, Number 4, available at http://www.prwatch.org/prwv5n4.pdf
359Id.
114one of the largest international petrochemical companies will not support ACSH, the great defender of petro-
chemical companies, one wonders who will."360 In 1991, when the \the great defender of the petrochemical
companies" last made its sources of funding available to the public, some forty percent of its $1.5 million an-
nual budget was supplied directly by industry, including a long list of food, drug and chemical companies.361
Since 1991, the ACSH has refused to disclose the sources or amounts of its funding. In a 1997 interview,
Whelan explained that since she was already being called a \paid liar for industry," she had decided to
abandon restraints on corporate funding altogether.362
A survey of the Council's board of directors provides some additional perspective on its mission. The board
includes scientists with an avowedly anti-regulatory bent, such as chairman A. Alan Moghissi, a former
EPA ocial who in 1990 served on a panel to challenge the EPA's policy requiring asbestos removal from
schools and other public buildings;363 Henry Miller, a former FDA ocial now at the Hoover Institution
(who participated in the pro-olestra campaign on his own behalf as well as through ACSH); corporate public
relations professionals Albert Nickel of the rm Lyons Lavey Nickel Swift (their motto: \We change percep-
tions"), and Lorraine Thelian, a senior partner at Ketchum Communications, which handles \environmental
PR work" for Dow Chemical, the Aspirin Foundation of America, Bristol Myers Squibb, and the National
Pharmaceutical Council.364
Procter & Gamble got its money's worth from Dr. Whelan and the ACSH.
Dr. Whelan took her spirited brand of advocacy to the newspapers, and made little eort at balanced
360Sidney Wolf, \DRKOOP.CON? America's Family Doctor and His Conicts of Interest: The Doctor in Need of Doctoring,"
TomPaine.com, 2001
361Sheldon Rampton and John Stauber, \In Industry's Hip Pocket? The American Council on Science and Health (ACSH),"
TomPaine.com, 2001
362Id.
363Id.
364Id.
115analysis. In an article that appeared in the Washington Times, Dr. Whelan wrote, \Within months we will
be able to buy a variety of delectable zero-fat snacks | a real-life case of getting something for (almost)
nothing."365 At another point, Dr. Whelan hailed olestra's approval by the FDA, writing \Dr. Kessler's
decision represents a triumph of sound science and common sense over scaremongering | with the American
consumer the clear winner."366 Whelan parroted Procter &Gamble's line on CSPI almost word for word,
implying that Jacobson and his cohort were untrustworthy and unscientic: \Since everyone these days
seems to be anti-fat, one might be forgiven for assuming that olestra would be welcomed by everyone. But
this has not been the case: The `usual suspects' who routinely condemn products of food technology declared
war on olestra | and so did a few respected scientists."367 Nowhere in the article did Whelan mention that
her group receives funding from P&G { at least $12,500 in 1995 and $10,000 in 1996.368 When questioned,
Whelan would say only that P&G's support represents less than one percent of her group's total budget,
and refused to comment further.369
The ACSH also acted as a stand-in for P&G on television. Dr. Whelan appeared on both NBC's Today
show and CNN's CNN Live to debate CSPI's Dr. Michael Jacobson, as well as on CNBC's Business Insiders
to debate CSPI's Mira Karstadt. According to the ACSH's newsletter, \ACSH was called upon to oer a
mainstream scientic perspective."370 The letter does not make clear who exactly \called on" the ACSH.
But the money { and Dr. Whelan's words { leave little doubt. According to the same newsletter, \On all
three programs, Dr. Whelan emphasized how fat-free foods containing olestra will oer weight-conscious
Americans more alternatives in their diet and refuted the fallacious and exaggerated claims of those who
365Elizabeth Whelan, \The New Skinny on Snack Foods," The Washington Times, January 28, 1996
366Id.
367Id.
368Ken Silverstein, \Washington on $10 Million a Day," Common Courage Press, 1998, p.63
369Ken Silverstein, \How the Chips Fell," Mother Jones, May/June 1997
370ACSH Newsletter, available at http://www.acsh.org/publications/newsletter/
116have attempted to describe olestra as nutritionally harmful."371
THE NATIONAL CONSUMERS LEAGUE
The same website that bears the enthusiastic endorsement of the ACSH also bears the cautious pseudo-
endorsement of the National Consumers League: \The National Consumers League (NCL) is fully condent
in the thorough review of this product by the FDA."372 That the NCL feels the need to endorse the FDA's
process, rather than the product itself, is suspicious; it scarcely seems like the endorsement of a front group.
There is a good reason for this: unlike the ACSH, the NCL was at least at one time a legitimate watchdog
group. Founded by labor and consumer activists at the turn of the century, the NCL calls itself \America's
oldest consumer organization."373 Today, the original consumer focus of the NCL has been heavily diluted;
while it continues some activism in the eld of child labor, the National Consumers League has come to rely
on corporate interests for a signicant portion of its budget. Though they refuse to give specic numbers
detailing how much money each particular corporation or industry association has contributed, League
ocials admit that thirty-nine percent of the group's 1997 budget of $1.3 million came from corporations
and industry associations.374 Asked why a consumer group would take any money at all from corporations
that invest so heavily in opposing consumer interests, NCL spokesperson Cleo Manuel says mournfully, \I
wish we didn't have to."375
It's easy to understand why Manuel feels that way; the inux of corporate funding appears to have had a
dramatic eect on the substantive content of the NCL's work. A survey of the publications produced by the
371Id.
372See http://www.wowchips.com/what/expert/text.html#NCL
373See http://www.natlconsumersleague.org/
374Russell Mokhiber, \Corporate Consumer Group," The Multinational Monitor, April, 1998, Volume 18, Number 4
375Id.
117National Consumer's League { and who paid for them - is illustrative:
 NCL's \Consumer Guide to Choosing Your Telephone Service" was paid for by Ameritech.
 NCL's \Consumer Credit Series" of reports was paid for by Fleet Finance Inc, a subsidiary of Fleet
Financial Group.
 A brochure entitled \Making Sense of Your New Communications Choices" was paid for by GTE.
 A pamphlet bearing the legend \Take Care with Over the Counter Asthma Medicine" was paid for by
Syntex, a pharmaceutical company.
 A newsletter, \Community Credit Link," was paid for by Visa USA.376
Of course, all manner of valuable products are produced by corporations for the benet of their customers.
What is far less likely is that any of the above publications contain information that threatens the nancial
interests of the sponsoring industries. In abandoning that function, one of the most important roles of the
National Consumers League has been quietly subverted.
The NCL has one other, more attenuated relationship to P&G's olestra campaign. In 1996, at the annual
\NCL Trumpeter Award Reception and Dinner," which brings in about forty percent of the League's annual
budget, the NCL honored Carol Tucker Foreman, a noted food safety advocate - who was also Procter &
Gamble's primary lobbyist on the olestra issue.377 Foreman's Safe Food Coalition is a legitimate organization;
but given NCL's increasing advocacy for corporate causes, and its support for the FDA's olestra approval,
it appears at least possible that Procter & Gamble convinced the National Consumers League to enhance
the pro-consumer reputation of P&G's corporate lobbyist.
376Id.
377Id. See also, \NCL Honors Carol Tucker Foreman With Trumpeter Award," National Consumers League, Press Release,
October 8, 1997. Available at http://www.natlconsumersleague.org/trmpctf.htm
118THE SHADOW FDA { PART II
When the tobacco industry came under attack from FDA Commissioner David Kessler, the tobacco industry
called on its roster of lawyers and consultants who served the FDA in the past { what I have called \the
Shadow FDA." The tobacco industry used former Commissioner Charlie Edwards not so much for what
he had to say, but for what it meant for him to say it. Those who leave public service carry with them
a credibility and reputation that would be unattainable in the private sector, and where food safety is at
stake, and protability depends on gaining the trust of wary consumers, credibility is paramount. Conscious
of the questions that surrounded olestra, and aware that they needed credible gure to stand behind their
product, Procter & Gamble called on two former Secretaries of Health and Human Services: Louis Sullivan
and Otis Bowen.
Louis Sullivan, a Secretary of HHS during the administration of George H. W. Bush, not only lobbied mem-
bers of Congress like Julia Carson; he also played a major role in Procter & Gamble's promotional campaign,
addressing press conferences and writing letters to newspaper editors on behalf of olestra. Only rarely did
these papers note that Sullivan was a paid P&G consultant. In one letter to the New York Times, Sullivan
- identied only as the president of the Morehouse School of Medicine { wrote unequivocally, Americans can
feel condent in the safety of snacks made with olestra."378 Sullivan also promoted olestra in a 10-minute
video P&G sent to local groups, such as Parent-Teacher Associations, as part of its marketing eort in
Columbus, Ohio.379
Many press outlets uncritically accepted the representations of Sullivan and Bowen as unbiased, and repro-
378Ken Silverstein, \How the Chips Fell," Mother Jones, May/June 1997
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119duced them verbatim. A story by the Associated Press was typical. Written under the headline, \Experts
Say Fake Fat Helps In Weight Control," the story read like a Procter & Gamble press release:
Former HHS Secretary Dr. Otis Bowen said he surveyed emergency rooms and physicians in Indiana and
found no evidence of olestra causing medical problems. \The product causes no signicant health risks, said
Bowen. I eat the chips and so do my grandchildren." Dr. Louis Sullivan, another former HHS secretary, said
too many Americans are obese and olestra gives them \another tool to improve their lifestyle and overall
health."380
Though it emphasized their status as former Cabinet members, the article makes no mention of the fact that
both were employed at the time by Procter & Gamble.
At another point, Bowen, a medical doctor, former two-time Indiana governor, and Secretary of Health and
Human Services under President Reagan, reassured journalists at a \press availability" that the concern over
olestra's gastrointestinal side eects was unnecessary. \On average," Bowen told members of the press, \all
people have gastrointestinal upsets every three months or so; the number of cases that have been called in
is probably an incidental thing."381
Like the tobacco industry's \Shadow FDA," that used its credibility to attack the FDA of David Kessler,
Louis Sullivan explicitly underlines his former government post when doing promotional work for Procter &
Gamble. On the wowchips.com website, Sullivan says
All Americans can feel condent in the safety of snacks made with olestra. As a former Secretary of Health
and Human Services, I am aware of the intense scrutiny new food ingredients like olestra are subject to
before they are approved by the FDA. The FDA with input from the many respected experts including the
National Cancer Institute carefully reviewed more than 25 years of research supporting olestra's safety. -
Louis Sullivan, M.D. President, Morehouse School of Medicine382
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120Like the Associated Press story, the Sullivan quote mentions nothing of his conict of interest. It also implies
{ incorrectly { that the National Cancer Institute has lent its name to olestra's approval. It has not.
CONCLUSION
What I hope this paper has shown is that the sins of the tobacco industry are not unique or personal to that
industry, but a natural and predictable outgrowth of the adversarial process that puts the Food and Drug
Administration between regulated industry and enormous prot. Because of the scope and nature of the
tobacco industry's long campaign of deception, it is tempting to see tobacco as a mad dog among industries,
the corporate equivalent of a \rogue state" that agrantly dees behavioral norms. This paper has sought
to expose that reasoning as na ve and unrealistic, and to suggest that, far from being unique, the actions of
the tobacco industry in fact adhere quite closely to corporate norms. As this paper has tracked the tobacco
industry's campaign against the FDA, and Procter & Gamble's campaign to secure olestra's approval and
market share, consistent parallels have emerged:
 Each industry gave generously to members of Congress, concentrating on the leadership of the two major
parties and the chairmen of important committees, each shifting their support with the changing of political
tides.
 Each relied on the loyalty of their home-state delegations to pressure the FDA with letters and with hostile
hearings.
 Each enlisted well-connected lobbyists to smooth over dissenters, and employed \Astroturf" campaigns to
generate pressure on reluctant legislators.
121 Each poured resources into scientic research and scientists, in order to produce a steady stream of favorable
data and friendly witnesses. Each proved willing to pick and choose among studies to nd those that t the
industry's agenda.
 Each was ruthless in attacking potential threats, lampooning and slandering opponents, often through
unaccountable third parties.
 Each used their vast corporate resources to purchase the support of credible organizations.
 Each employed a cast of former public servants { especially veterans of the FDA and HHS { to provide a
public counterweight to government.
There is a dierence between the actions of Philip Morris and the actions of Procter & Gamble, and it is an
important one { there is no reason to believe that olestra is addictive, that it has been marketed to children,
or that it will kill millions. But when it comes to their approach to the regulatory process, that dierence is
only one of degree. I cannot say whether the FDA's approval of olestra was a mistake - I am unqualied to
judge the arguments on their scientic merits. But I hope this paper has demonstrated that the process that
preceded olestra's approval was dangerously tainted | that institutional concerns unrelated to the public
health appear to have played a signicant role in securing its safe passage through the regulatory process.
The continuing danger to the American public is not so much in olestra itself as in the increasing porosity
of the regulatory structure. This paper could equally have focused its attention on pharmaceuticals, on
blood products, or on medical devices, and demonstrated the same consistent industry strategies and the
same systemic failures of our political and regulatory process. Eventually, such lax procedures will cause
unnecessary harm to the American public, a public that barely questions the safety of the products it
consumes because it believes in the FDA.
122The relationship between the FDA and its regulated industries is by necessity adversarial, and will be so
long as there is prot to be made in the sale of food and medicine. For practical, if not for moral purposes,
we must come to grips with that fact. But this recognition need not lead to resignation. If the tobacco
industry blazed a trail that other industries learned to follow { as I believe it did { it also left a blueprint for
reform. What follows is merely a thumbnail sketch of prophylactic steps that could re-empower the FDA to
protect the public health:
 The federal campaign nance structure has warped the loyalties of the Congress. The cost of campaigning
continues to climb with each election cycle, but because only a fraction of one percent of the voting public
donates money to elected ocials, legislators face a \double constituency" problem: they must answer not
only to the voters, but to their nancial supporters. Too often, the nancial supporters carry the day. So
long as Members are beholden to wealthy individuals and corporations to win reelection, special interests
will be able to use the Congress as a weapon against the FDA. While banning unregulated \soft money"
is a good rst step, it is insucient; it would be a simple enough matter to redirect soft money into hard
money donations, particularly if the Congress raises the hard money cap (as it is currently considering).
Attempting to contain private expenditures is not only unfeasible, but potentially unconstitutional. Instead,
the Congress should adopt a strong system of voluntary public nancing for federal elections { a solution
which eliminates the dependence of candidates on private wealth, but respects constitutional guarantees.
 The lobbying system has a clear public value: it enables legislators and regulators to hear persuasive
arguments and gain access to valuable information. Lobbying is not a problem in itself. It becomes a
problem, however, when lobbying is bound up with campaign donations, and where it perpetuates a revolving
door between public service and the private sector. The revolving door process not only introduces personal
relationships to what should be neutral policy determinations, it also oers a dangerous incentive for public
123servants to satisfy private masters, in the hope of future employment.
President Clinton instituted waiting periods between the time someone left his administration and the time
they could return to lobby it, but repealed them when his own administration left oce { just in time for his
loyalists to capitalize. Those prophylactic measures should be restored and enforced. Legislators should also
be required to keep and make publicly available a record of the time they spend with registered lobbyists {
another simple step toward achieving a transparent process.
 One of the most odious acts of the tobacco industry was its submission of fraudulent scientic testimony to
government agencies. While there is no public evidence of Procter & Gamble engaging in such conduct, the
FDA's approval of olestra was based almost entirely on industry-sponsored research { a situation that leaves
open the possibility of fraud. There must be severe penalties for organizations that knowingly submit false
or incomplete information to the FDA, including signicant nes for corporations and criminal sanctions for
executive ocers. Unlike most criminal sanctions, there is reason to believe that such penalties { if vigorously
enforced { could have a signicant deterrent eect. The corporate context is one of the few scenarios in which
the rational calculations inherent in deterrent theory actually take place.
 Other measures must address the dangers of tainted scientic research, increase awareness of front groups
like HBI and the ACSH, and protect the public market for information from the emerging monopoly structure
of the mass media.
These are but a few suggestions, a jumping-o point for what must be a comprehensive series of systemic
reforms.
The American public cannot aord to assure itself that the corporate malfeasance of the tobacco industry
is unique to that industry and that product. It is not. The problems described in this paper are systemic
problems, endemic within the adversarial structure that denes the FDA-industry relationship, and if they
are to be successfully addressed they must be met with systemic solutions.
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